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ABSTRACT 
 
COMPETITIVE JIHADISM: A NEW THEORETHICAL APPROACH 
TO JIHADI DE-FACTO STATES 
 
 
YAĞIŞ, Mehmet Yavuz 
M.Sc., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Associate Professor Burak Bilgehan Özpek 
September 2015 
 
World politics is introduced to a new type of entity with great differences within, 
namely jihadi de facto states. Due to its rather un-celebrated characteristics and lack 
of legal basis it was hard to encircle it with definitions and understand with theories. 
This thesis is concerned with state-building phase of jihadi de facto states and 
especially it’s consolidation of sovereignty and jihadi competition with their parent 
states. This thesis accepts “ Competitive Democratization” of Nina Caspersen as 
main frame and customizes it for jihadi de- facto states. Moreover it accepts each 
fact comprises three-level reality and grand theories may not properly function as 
Rosenau forecasts and names it as “Turbulence Approach”. In this study, it is 
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acclaimed that there is a positive correlation between consolidation level of 
sovereignty of a jihadi de facto state and it’s competition on jihadi policies with it’s 
parent state(s). Consolidation requirements are adjusted accordingly League of 
Nations parameters. I especially confirmed that adopted a more jihadist policy by de 
facto jihadi state comparing to it’s parent state will have positive contribution to its 
sovereignty level by helping it to gain more repercussion from target audiences and 
create its own legitimate basis. I applied this hypothesis on “Islamic State-Iraq-
Syria” example throughout the thesis, as it is the richest by offering data to study 
and the most contemporary one. Although it is a recent fact, this case proved to be 
fully supportive. 
 
Keywords:  Competitive Jihadism, jihadi de facto state, de facto state, Islamic State, 
consolidation of sovereignty, ISIS, Republic of Iraq, Arab Republic of Syria, content 
analysis. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
REKABETÇİ CİHATÇILIK: CİHATÇI DE FACTO DEVLETLERE YENİ BİR 
TEORİK YAKLAŞIM 
 
 
Yağış, Mehmet Yavuz 
 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doçent Dr. Burak Bilgehan Özpek 
 
Eylül 2015 
 
Dünya siyaseti, cihatçı de facto devlet adında içinde nevi şahsına münhasır özellikler 
barındıran yeni bir siyasi birim ile tanıştı. Çokça karşılaşılmayan karakteristiği ve 
meşruiyet eksiğinden dolayı bu realiteyi tanımlarla çevrelemek ve onu teoriler 
ışığında anlamaya çalışmak ise zorlu bir uğraşıdır. Bu tez cihatçı de facto devletlerin 
devlet kurma aşamaları, egemenlik pekiştirme süreçleri ve özellikle söylemsel bazda 
ana devletleri ile olan rekabetlerini ortak potada inceler. Bu tez Nina Caspersen’in “ 
Rekabetçi Demokratikleşme” yaklaşımını genel çerçeve olarak kabul ederek onu 
cihatçı de facto devletlere göre yeniden uyarlar. Dahası, her gerçekliğin üç fazı 
olduğunu ,büyük teorilerin bunu etkili bir biçimde analiz edemeyeceklerini ve kendi 
dinamiklerine bakılarak anlaşılacağını söyleyen Rosenau’nun “Türbülans 
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Yaklaşımı” nı  da teorik çerçeve olarak kabul etmektedir.  Bu çalışmada cihatçı bir 
de facto devletin ana devlet(ler)inden daha cihatçı bir politika edinmesi ile onun 
egemenliğinin pekişmesi arasında pozitif bir bağıntı olduğu iddia edilmektedir.  
Egemenlik pekiştirmesinin gereksinimleri ise Milletler Cemiyeti’nin devlet 
tanımından yararlanılarak edinilmiştir. Ortaya konulan olgu şudur ki bir cihatçı de 
facto devlet eğer ana devlet(ler)inden daha cihatçı bir politika geliştirir ise bu durum 
onun egemenliğinin pekişmesinde ve hedef kitlesi üzerinde olumlu ve meşru kılıcı 
etkiye yol açacaktır. Bu hipotez örneğin güncel olması, zengin veri sunması ve 
etkilerinin açıktan gözlenebiliyor olmasından dolayı “ İslam Devleti-Irak-Suriye” 
örneği üzerinde tez boyunca test edilmiştir. Bu konu oldukça güncel bir olgu olsa da 
test sonucu hipotezi ikna edici bir şekilde doğrulaşmıştır.                                                                                                                                   
 
Anahtar Kelimeler:  Rekabetçi cihatçılık, ,çihatçı de facto devlet, de facto devlet, 
İslam Devleti , egemenlik pekiştirilmesi, IŞİD, Irak Cumhuriyeti, Suriye Arap 
Devleti, içerik analizi. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
Jihad and Jihadism are two fairly old phenomena albeit not obsolete. 
Adopted for a long time as a state policy by the pre-modern empire states ruled by 
Islamic law, it was nearly put aside since the first quarter of the 20th century. Rebirth 
of jihadism as a primal and a bold tier of a global agenda happened with the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 along with its repulsion by the mujaheeds. This 
period led a way at the end of which Al-Qai’dah  was born as the uncontested brand 
for methodology and the pioneer for global jihad seeking the establishment of a 
global Islamic caliphate. 
The word “Al-Qai’dah ”, for centuries, carried only one meaning, “The Base”1. 
However, with the dawn of 1988 the word itself adopted another and maybe more 
dominant meaning. It commenced to describe an organization, which designated 
                                               
 
1 Arabic Computer Dictionary: English-Arabic, Arabic-English By Ernest Kay, Multi-lingual International Publishers, 1986. 
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“global armed struggle for the salvation of the Islamic Ummah2” as its ultimate goal. 
In contemporary world politics, Al-Qai’dah, functions as an umbrella organization 
under which there are local groups operating in from Somalia to Indonesia to Syria 
to Central Asia to Yemen and from Caucasus to North African Coast. The rise of 
The Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria has however challenged the perspective of 
Al-Qai’dah, which has functioned as a decentralized but monolithic organization. 
Since the mid-2014, a discrepancy on the methodology of how to reach the ultimate 
goal, establishing a global Caliphate, has surfaced. Starting from the initial days of 
The Islamic State, al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State, followed a different 
agenda deviating from his former patron, Al-Qai’dah.  As stated above, while Al-
Qai’dah operates mainly as an umbrella organization, which delivers franchises and 
accepts pledges of local groups, if not installing them by itself, The Islamic State 
represents a new approach to the Jihadi movement. 
The Islamic State has taken the current policy of Al-Qa’idah one step further and 
redefined it by establishing a caliphate before establishing emirates and linking them 
to each other under the authority of a claimed Caliphate. This is to say, the strategy 
and methodology of The Islamic State deviated from mainstream Al-Qai’dah 
agenda for before installing local franchises of small-scaled emirates, and it 
announced the establishment of a self-declared Khilafa. However, there are two 
challenges The Islamic State has faced after putting forward its methodology. First, 
its Khilafa is established on the sovereignty zones of two countries, which are the 
Republic of Iraq and the Arab Republic of Syria. That is to say, The Islamic State’s 
attempt to establish a Khilafa on these countries automatically puts them into a 
                                               
 
2 Eng : Nation. Refers to all Muslims. 
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conflict. Second, The Islamic State has faced a legitimacy problem in the eyes of 
Jihadist groups and organizations. Therefore, emerged with a claim of statehood, 
The Islamic State adopted two deviant strategies in order to avert the aforementioned 
challenges. 
First of all, in order to consolidate and sustain its authority, it commenced an intense 
institutionalization process by establishing governmental bodies, disciplining and 
forming armed forces and behaving like a de-jure state. Secondly, it has performed a 
nearly unprecedented propagation campaign reinforced by formal publications, 
media releases, reports, video and audio broadcastings as well as by informal blogs, 
fan pages and millions of tweets.   
It is uncontested that al-Baghdadi adopted these policies in order to strengthen his 
position as the caliph and the position of the newly founded state in an extremely 
hostile environment. It is safe to argue that al-Baghdadi’s strategies stress to gain 
legitimacy. However, within the current context of international politics, al-
Baghdadi should be aware that The Islamic State will not be regarded as a legitimate 
actor by the other actors of the international system. Thus, one can ask the question 
of why is The Islamic State (IS) involved in state-building efforts and ambitiously 
making jihadist propaganda. 
This study argues that The Islamic State (IS) is a de facto state. Therefore, state 
building and propaganda efforts of The Islamic State (IS) might be related to its bid 
for deepening its sovereignty. This argument necessitates the examination of the 
basic concepts of the term “sovereignty” by focusing on The Islamic State’s 
practices. In line with the discussion, this study puts the term “Competitive 
Jihadism” forward in order to explain The Islamic State’s policy to consolidate its 
sovereignty. 
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The Research question this thesis tackles is “ Is there a positive correlation between 
a jihadist de facto state’s more jihadist policies than its parent states and 
consolidation of its sovereignty”.  
 To build a theoretical framework, the literature of the International Relations 
discipline was reviewed. In doing so, grand theories were visited. Nevertheless, 
since Jihadi de facto states are rather understudied, James Rosenau’s “turbulence 
theory” was regarded as a starting point. Then, the term “competitive 
democratization” coined by Nina Caspersen was linked to the Turbulence Theory.  
As a result, “competitive jihadism” framework was built in order to explain The 
Islamic State’s survival strategy.  
Following theoretical discussions, the methodology of this study is shared in 
Chapter 3. In this chapter, hypotheses and the variables are presented. In addition 
conceptualization of the terms “de facto”, “sovereignty” and “jihadism” is made. 
Moreover, the term “sovereignty” is operationalized in order to measure the level of 
consolidation. The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria is selected as the case study and 
the “content analysis method” is applied. Chapter 4 has two main bodies. After the 
introduction of a brief historical background on the rise of the jihadist de facto 
Islamic State, the competition between The Islamic State and the metropole states, 
which are Syria and Iraq, is dealt with. In doing so, the population size, territorial 
ownership and functioning capacity of the state apparatus of The Islamic State are 
examined and are compared with the metropole states. A similar test is made within 
the framework of the jihadist policies as well.  
In Chapter 5, empirical findings are compared with the hypotheses presented and a 
positive correlation is observed.  It should be noted that this study provides 
empirical data and a prospective theoretical framework for further research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
 
This section has four main goals to achieve. Firstly it seeks to examine the 
role of Non-State actors (NSA) within the grand theories of International Relations. 
Secondly, the question of whether de facto states could be regarded as non-state 
actors is discussed. Thirdly, Rosenau’s Turbulence approach is applied to designate 
jihadist entities in the literature. Finally it coins the term “Competitive Jihadism” in 
order to produce a hypothesis that could address the research question of this study. 
 
2.1 Theoretical Explication of Non-State Actors  
   
 
 
Non-State actors chiefly point to players other than states that have enough power to 
influence international politics. These actors can be international organizations; 
international enterprises or even individuals. However, it is classified under two 
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subclasses: intergovernmental organizations and transnational or international 
organizations.3 
Grand theories of international relations have different stances towards non-state 
actors, and the actual statehood of an actor mostly determined how grand theories 
would approach it. Moreover, the importance of non-state actors and their 
capabilities of creating an impact in international politics is one of the crossroads 
among the grand theories and sometimes this very issue shows the characteristics of 
Theory. Thus, it is not possible to speak on a shared view regarding non-state actors 
agreed upon by grand theories except concerning their existence.  This widely 
argued position of non-state actors in the international system causes a significant 
void to be filled.  This section will map out the stances of grand theories regarding 
this notion.  
  
 
2.1.1 Realism and Non-State Actors  
 
 
 
The realist view of international relations adopts a very strict state-oriented view of 
politics.  Realism very briefly highlights the importance of egoism in human beings 
and the lack of an upper legislator and executor among states described by 
anarchism and its restrictive impact on politics among nations.4 For political realism, 
rationalism and state-orientalism are descriptive notions. Thus, political realism 
                                               
 
3 Brown, S. New Forces, Old Forces, and the Future of World Politics. Post Cold War Edition, Harper Collins College 
Publishers ,New York,1995 p.113 
4  Gilpin, R. “ The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism” International Organization , 38(2)(Spring 1984) The MIT 
Press,  pp. 287  
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accepts that states are the pioneering agents in international relations and 
acknowledges that the nature of state behaviors is flawed.5  In such an environment, 
realists expect states to pursuit power maximization in order to survive in an 
anarchic and pessimistic environment. 
Although first specimens of political realism can be traced back to Thucydides, 
Machiavelli and Hobbes, its emergence as a systematic theory happened after the 
Second World War by political scientists who adopted the name “political realists” 6 
By doing so, Morgenthau conceptualized the notion that comes from early ages, 
transformed and theorized it.  
First generation realists advocate that flawed human nature is the main driver of the 
states that are the main players in international relations.  For realism, the state is the 
sole legitimate monopoly of force. Therefore, any other agent that arises as a focus 
of force is a natural threat to the state. Thus, national security, survival and the will 
for power are the main components of a modern nation-state.  Functionally equal 
states’ struggle for power is the driver of politics among nations. As can be seen, 
power is perceived as a substance merely distributable among nations (used as a 
synonym for state), therefore the only player having enough power to impact 
international relations are states. Thus, states are welcomed as the only entities that 
classical realists credit in international relations while the presence and impact of 
non-state actors are explicitly ignored and downplayed. 
As for second-generation realists, structural realists, human nature is no more the 
main reference point. It is rather substituted with the structure of the international 
                                               
 
5  Thompson, K. W., Moralism and Morailty in Politics and Diplomacy London, University Press of America, New York 1985 
p20 
6  H. J. Morgenthau, ,Politics Among Nations  McGraw –Hill , New York, 1993, 
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system. For Waltz too, the state is the main agent in the international system that 
behaves in an anarchical structure despite being characterized by a hierarchical 
structure. 7   Structural realists introduced the idea of the existence of an upper 
mechanism, structure of international relations, and highlighted the sameness of 
functions of the nation states and distinguished them by their differently distributed 
capabilities. According to them, it was balanced and the status quo was what the 
international system’s players were seeking. In order to understand this, structural 
realists devised balancing theories. For instance, Waltz coined the term ‘balance of 
power’8 and Walt coined ‘Balance of threat’. However, both threat and power are 
generated and posed by the counterparts of the states, which are also states.  
Yet another notion realists tried to theorize is polarity and state behavior in different 
polarity situations. In fact, realists are interested in how states behave and why they 
should do so in different scenarios i.e. unipolarity (International system where there 
is only one hegemon and no rival to it), bipolarity 9(two power focuses are present at 
the same time) and multipolarity. (the existence of more than one power hub in an 
international system) 
Thus, neo-realists too, accepted states as the mere entities by disowning the term 
‘human nature’ coined by their predecessors, classical realists. The main difference 
for them and the main cause of every type of interaction among states is the structure 
of the system, so it is systemic. Therefore, as long as the states are the only players 
in the system so the power to influence the system or to get influenced by it can 
solely be attributed to states.  
                                               
 
7 Donnely, J ,Theories of International Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2009 p. 56. 
8 Waltz, K, Theory of International Relations , Waweland Press, Illnois, 2011 , p 101   
9  Mesquita, B. B. , “ Measuring Systemic Polarity” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 19(2) Jun. 1976  p 187 
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For the other prominent realists, predominantly, a state oriented perspective is 
welcomed nearly without questioning. Novelties are either concerned with the 
behaviors of states under different circumstances or with their natures or else, but 
very limitedly they have argued on any actor other than states.  
It should be noted that very few realists appreciated the role of non-state actors in 
international relations, albeit not as one of the main actors but rather as proxies. 
Wolfers is one of the realist scholars who studied the interconnectedness between 
states and the non-state actors during the midst of the Cold War. Accepting 
unarguable championship of the states, Wolfers accepted non-state actors as the 
remote tools ready for the usage of states. Wolfers argued that the “state approach” 
is not enough and not adequate to understand the politics among nations.10 Wolfers 
suggested that the “non-state approach” should be instrumented in politics in order 
to understand the shifts in loyalties of units. For him, international relations could 
not be reduced to mere “ billiard ball” modeling and non-state actors like armed 
groups, influential people, international organizations and even ideologies were 
being utilized by states in order to fulfill their ultimate goals.11 Wolfer’s perception 
of the relationship between states and non-state actors as an asymmetric type of 
collaboration12 , in fact, shows that he also perceived these actors as means for the 
states; hence states are the sole and primal game players. 
Realism as a grand international relations theory has not adopted the claim of 
explaining all aspects of relations among nations. Besides, it made it clear that 
                                               
 
10 McLean, G.A. , “ Clinton’s Foreign Policy in Russia : From Deterrence and Isolation to Democratization and Engagement” 
Ashgate Publishing, New York, 2006,  p 60. 
11 Wolfers. A, “ Discord and Collaboration , Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1962  p. 69 
12 Özpek, Burak Bilgehan, De Facto States and Inter-Military Conflicts, Unpublished PhD. Dissertation, Bilkent University 
Department of International Relations, Ankara, 2010 p.27 
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realism primarily deals with inter-state relations and major power politics, polarity 
and especially with war and peace.13 Thus, particularly for structural realists, non-
state actors and state relations with them are merely understood as an extension of 
the power politics of a given state.  Neoclassical theorists, however, have given 
room for non-state actors, albeit a minor one, in their studies of international 
relations. They tend to recognize all non-state actors without differentiating between 
them according to their functions. They accept them as pressure groups on domestic 
politics. 14  Moreover some theorists suggested that domestic groups like military or 
one wing of bureaucracy along with NGO’s may affect decision-making processes.15  
As can be explicitly seen, while classical and neoclassical realism allocate some 
space for non-state actors in their work, defensive and offensive realism mostly 
ignore the phenomenon in their studies. In brief, it can be said for realism that non-
state actors are either neglected like with structural realists or perceived as proxies or 
extensions of a state as in Wolfer’s studies. It can also find itself a place in 
neoclassical realism as a secondary role, restricted as an agent that may influence a 
state’s domestic decision making progress yet not celebrated by any of them as an 
agent in international relations which has enough power to influence the system in 
which it is identified.  
Today, it is undeniable that non-state actors occupy a great deal of international 
relations and not only international banks, multinational companies or 
                                               
 
13 Evan Laksmana, “  Realism and Non State Actors Revisited”, (Jan 22 2013), ,  http://www.e-ir.info/2013/01/22/realism-and-
non-state-actors-revisited/ E-International Relations Students retrieved 10.03.2015 
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intergovernmental organizations are counted as non-state actors but also militia 
groups, de facto states and armed ideological organizations are included in this 
category. In the following chapter, I will proceed to a liberal view of non-state actors 
in international relations. 
 
2.1.2 Idealism and Non-State Actors 
 
Idealism, yet another grand theory of international relations, adopts a significantly 
different stance towards non-state actors compared to realist theories. For liberal 
theory of international relations, although states occupy a great place, other factors 
are also important. Thus, contrary to realism, idealism does not solely deal with 
politics among nations and abstains from downgrading the complexity of the system 
into inter-state interactions. It also welcomes the role of non-state actors into 
international relations. Thus idealism poses a challenge to realism concerning the 
significance of non-state actors. Idealism primarily rejects the state’s centric stance 
in realism and Keohane and Nye state that non-state actors are as important as states 
are.16 
Idealism puts effort into repelling the pessimism of realism regarding state behavior 
and the nature of the agent by its native optimistic view and it strongly states that 
states are not the only actors in international relations. Verily, it promotes the 
necessity and importance of non-state actors as regulatory organs or actors, and as 
check and balance systems in the international system, especially in terms of 
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preventing clashes and providing more wealth and co-operation. However, pluralists 
opine that non-state actors, despite all the power they possess to influence the 
system are not always necessarily in collaboration with states nor do they always 
share one or any of the state’s opinions regarding political or economic issues. 
Moreover, as there are NGO’s and IGO’s and other organizations, there are armed 
groups, drug cartels, freedom fighters, pirates, and hacktivists as well.17 Therefore, 
broadly organized organizations like Al-Qa’idah , entities that have territorial claims 
like The Islamic State or feminist activists like Femen can be considered under such 
a category. Because indeed each of such examples has enough credit to claim 
influence in international relations or pioneer one kind of ideology and has enough 
impact to operate organizational cadres and so on. 
Idealists indirectly challenged realists about the ownership of the use of force as 
well. Upon their rejection of the state as the sole owner of power and hierarchies of 
the importance of issues (military over economy, high politics over low politics), 
idealists created room for non-state actors to act in an international system18 and 
gave them some credit to enjoy what realists advocated only states do. Thus, 
idealists accept the notion of exercising brutal force when the actor is a non-state 
actor. Apart from realists, idealists do not tend to accept that these actors should 
necessarily be proxies or extensions of any given state but could actually operate 
independently for their own causes. Hence, non-statehood of an actor is not a 
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restrictive feature for utilizing force or raising policies and bargaining for them in 
the international arena. 
Liberalist vehemently advocated the importance of harmony and cooperation in 
order to establish peace. They also highlighted the importance of intergovernmental 
or non-governmental actors that are in fact non-state actors. For instance, liberals 
accept international organizations and international law as the moral reach for the 
prevention of clashes.19 These organizations are both means to prevent inter-state 
conflicts and results of the co-operations between states. This collaboration stems 
from the pessimistic view of idealism that highlights the causal linkage between 
anarchy and co-operation.  Nevertheless, unlike realists, idealists attribute 
independent features to Non-state actors and they accept their capacity of creating 
impact in the system, not necessarily these non-state actors always serve to establish 
peace and stability and are always pro –status quo actors but they can also act in 
opposition to the system and can utilize non-peaceful means for their own top-end 
goals. The League of Nations and The 969 Movement of Burma can be given as 
examples. Even though both these organizations constitute examples for non-state 
actors, the former was found in order to keep the security and peace after World War 
I, while the latter leads extremist political, ethnic and ecclesiastical campaigns 
against Burma’s minorities.20 Thus, although uncelebrated by the vast majority of 
the international relations actors, existence and the ability of conducting independent 
policies of organizations like jihadi groups are accepted.  How idealists perceive 
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international relations contains three elements: system, structure and the process.21  
Non-state actors are the part of a system located in the structure (distribution of 
capabilities). They effect and get affected by the system, which is the process. So the 
system designates the characteristics of the patterns of relations, these patterns come 
to existence by the interactions of the agents whose capabilities are distributed and 
are located in the structure. In this scheme of behaviors, non-state actors are also 
able to move like states regardless of their ultimate aim or their types and skills. 
What changes is either their capabilities or their abilities to establish interactions, or 
both at the same time.  Thus organizations like Al-Qa’idah , The Islamic State and 
FARC are identified in a system and they naturally have their shares from 
distribution of capabilities and with this share they commence to interact in order to 
have their aims reached.  Non-state actors are of great importance in this three-stage 
mechanism. 
Systemic liberalism, also known as neo-liberal institutionalism, suggests that 
although states are the primal actors and the system is anarchic, this does not 
necessarily require a conflict among states. In order to compensate the lack of an 
upper regulator, systemic liberalism highlights the importance of non-state actors as 
regulators such as the NATO, UN or regional NSAs. 22  Moreover, systemic 
liberalism sees the seriousness of the threat posed by some kinds of non-state actors 
and calls for other states to create alliances and institutions in order to defy such 
threats.23 
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To summarize, it can be said that idealists have been championing the importance of 
non-state actors since the very first days. Although the perception of different types 
of liberalist views differ from each other, so long as their view of them are the same 
or greatly similar so is their stance towards non-state actors. All of the idealists 
accept that states are not the only actors and many advocate the necessity of non-
state actors as regulators, actors, mitigators and so on. Consequently, non-state 
actors’ role and function point to a significant split between idealists and realists. It 
can be said that idealists not only accept the role and significance of the non-state 
actors but also support and appreciate their role for a stable international 
environment. For idealists, non-governmental organizations, intergovernmental 
organizations, multinational organizational organizations are of utmost importance 
for providing and enabling stability and co-operation. Liberals have the full 
understanding that not all kinds of non-state actors are co-operative or opt for 
reconciliation. For example, idealists are aware that globalization offers a convenient 
atmosphere for violent or revolutionist, illegal non-state actors.24 Hereby, non-state 
actors are accepted as important and powerful players in international relations by 
idealists. In this sense, this paper accepts how idealists regard non-state actors’ 
power of influencing the international relations and the system regardless of their 
ultimate aims. 
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2.1.3 Non-Traditional International Relations Approaches and Non-State 
Actors  
 
As can be seen above, mainstream theories have debated on the nature of non-state 
actors in international relations. Although liberals represent a greatly different 
bearing than realists, they still are have not reached a definite understanding of the 
comprehensive nature of non-state actors. Mostly, motives and driving forces of 
non-state actors are neglected unless they IGO or NGO’s. Moreover, great deal of 
liberalist studies focus on intergovernmental or Non-governmental organizations 
even though they are not the only categories of non-state actors. Besides, liberalists 
show a systemic presence and mostly speak of its benefits while few writers focus 
on threatening or challenging features of some non-state actors. Although 
mainstream international relations theories had overwhelming debates on non-state 
actors, non-traditional approaches also made a contribution to the debate. 
Constructivist theory of international relations attempts to fill the gap where liberals 
and realists failed to fill. 
Generally speaking, constructivism highlights the relationship between agent and 
structure and adopts a level of analysis relevant to every issue.25 Constructivism 
submit to the claim that agent and structure shape and re-shape each other. By doing 
so, it brings identities and norms to the forefront. It states that actors behave in 
accordance with the notion of identities and therefore, distribution of power, anarchy 
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and will of power are not the only drivers for the actors.  They are shaped by the 
interaction of the units, which produces the structure.26 For constructivism, there are 
two kinds of norms that regulate the relations: regulative and constructive. While the 
former lays the rules and specifies the boundaries, the latter directly involves the 
formation process of actors.  Therefore, interaction directly points to the evolution of 
actors, norms and identities.   
Constructivism tries to understand the reason behind the issues that grand theories 
failed to comprehend. Thus, it mainly deals with sovereignty, agent-structure 
relations and their motives. Thereby, states and their relations with each other as an 
evolutionary process are the main concern of constructivism. And this causes non-
state actors to play a remarkable role in the construction process of identities, which 
influences the inter-state relations. Thus, unlike realism, constructivism leaves room 
for non-state actors and unlike liberalism; it ascribes an identity-norm builder to the 
non-state actors instead of focusing on the material gains stemming from 
cooperation. 27 Constructivists regard the policy-making process as an extension of 
identity and norm politics as ergo actions of the non-state actors should be 
understood in this sense too. So long as many non-state actors arise with such 
identity, this point of view is applicable on them as well. To clarify the point, Hamas 
can be given as an example. As a non-state actor, the Indian Congress Party, was 
founded in order to repel the occupation of the United Kingdom in India. After the 
liberation of India from the British occupation, the party acted in accordance with 
the new identity and new norms. Hamas in Palestine and Hizballah of Lebanon are 
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other examples of entities that underwent a similar transition. However, theory itself 
does not deal with the roles of non-state actors in international relations but it rather 
portrays them as focuses whose power hold potential to affect the social structure 
and the policy making process.28 Although constructivism does not treat non-state 
actors as primal actors and regards them as tools and outcomes of inter-state 
relations, the constructivist perception can be utilized in order to explicate a different 
kind of non-state actors.  Besides, the constructivist approach advocates that identity 
creation is a process and the existence of non-state actors contributes positively to 
the identity building process.  
In this respect, this paper deems the novelties introduced by constructivism such as 
the importance of identity and norms as regulative and constructive indicators of the 
behaviors of non-state actors like Al-Qa’idah and The Islamic State.  
Focusing on norm building within a state and a society, constructivist approach in 
international relations is not able to explain the de facto states as they commence a 
process of norm building apart from their patron states. Thus, constructivism 
analyses how The Islamic State contributes to the norm building progress within Iraq 
and Syria but ignores its own identity creation process. However, The Islamic State 
itself is a major identity builder within its territory and is focused on its own identity 
rather than on contributing to the identity building progress in Iraq and in Syria. 
Hence, constructivism is not a key explanatory approach for The Islamic State’s 
case. 
Post-Structuralism is another non-traditional international relations approach that 
aims to deconstruct Meta narratives that produce and reproduce the sovereignty and 
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unquestioned postulates.29  By doing this, it tries to dissolve the artificial power 
relations, dominance and especially the dominance and sovereignty of the state. 
Social scientists who are generally linked with the Frankfurt School of thought 
introduced the post-modernist de-construction notion to international relations and 
they adamantly aimed the grand narrations, one of which is the explicit sovereignty 
of the state. Ashley points that the state-centric reading of international relations 
naturally begets oppression and conceals the truth.30 Thus, in opposition to state 
centric grand theories, post structuralism poses a challenge to the state’s sovereign 
and dominant role in international relations and creates room for non-state actors to 
express themselves as they interact.  
The critical Theory, on the other hand, criticized the Westphalian state-system and 
wholly accepted sovereignty narrations. By this, the critical theory regards 
international system as the primal reason and the source of conflicts.31 According to 
it,  “information” and “ communication” as well as the connections between the 
observer and the observed (where the observer is located to observe) is of great 
importance. Thus, scholars of the Frankfurt School who came up with the critical 
approach, criticize modern states and the state system’s cost to the world. They 
study the mechanism of the sets of relationships through which the states function 
with other actors. According to Cox, states only play a mediator role in the system.32 
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According to Critical Theorists, the totalitarian stance of the state in the system 
bended the ethical norms and re-defined them in the form they wish it to be. 
Although the critical theory deals the Westphalian System and criticizes it and its 
ramifications, it does not take dealing de facto states in a positivist stance to its 
agenda. The critical theory’s main agenda is creating an anti-balance against 
problem-solving theories. Since the main focus of critical theorists is to observe 
whether a narration or a mindset to be applied on a fact produce sovereignty or not, 
and to try to understand a present system via tools produced by that system that will 
eventually reproduce the sovereignty, critical theorists especially look at whether de 
facto states and their narrations contribute to human emancipation. Hence, given the 
fact that de facto states adopt current narrations available in the contemporary 
system, approaching to such states from within the system reproduces sovereignty. 
Thus, critical theorists don’t deal with de facto states. 
 
 
2.2 Jihadi Groups as a Non-State Actors in Literature 
 
According to the Dictionary of Social Sciences, non-state actor means being an 
organization with sufficient power to influence and cause a change without being 
linked to any institution or state.33 Keeping fidelity with the given description of the 
notion, many examples can be given for “ non-state actors.” Although the definition 
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of NSA points the features of the entity, functions and capabilities of NSA’s differ 
greatly and in a broad range. Thus, it is important to make an accurate and valid 
assessment in order to develop a true understanding of the notion. .  
There are several types of Non-state actors than can fit into the definition made 
above. One of them is Non-Governmental Organizations. These kinds of non-state 
actors do not pursue profit nor are they biologically bound to neither any 
government nor any governmental body. They can function in political, economic, 
social, and religious fields and can be funded by governments, businessmen or may 
be run by mere volunteers. TEMA foundation in Turkey and the “Association for the 
Protection of the Lebanese Heritage” in Lebanon are only two examples of it. Yet 
another type of non-state actors are the Multinational Corporations that seek 
profitand are based in one country as the country of origin despite the fact that they 
operates in a multinational scope. Some of these NSA’s may have a budget that 
surpasses that of some states. This advantage naturally bestows them with might and 
a bargain power in international relations. Banking companies like HSBC, CITI 
group et cetera, energy companies like BP, Chevron, Gazprom et cetera may 
influence the international system and interactions occurring in it by the virtue of 
their gigantic budgets, strategic importance and lobbying power. Yet another type of 
non-state actor is the international media. It is known that media outlets have 
immediate influence over the audience and a direct and indirect influence over the 
rulers. Media outlets like Reuters, Al Jazeera, CNN or BBC are believed to have 
significant effect on the audiences and the foreign policies of the countries. There is 
even a theory called CNN Effect theory that suggests this claim to be true since the 
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Cold War.34 Relatively, a new aspect of media, social media, can be talked about as 
non-state actor here as well. All actors and their supporters are excessively using 
Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Archive.org, Justpaste.in and such websites in order to 
influence the system. Religious groups, international diaspora, and de facto states 
are other types of non-state actors. 
Yet another type of non-state actors is named ‘violent non-state actors’ or ‘armed 
non-state actors’. Violent non-state actor (VNSA) refers to any organization or 
armed group that adopts (illegal) violence to attain its goals, thereby challenging the 
state’s monopoly of violence.35 Violent non-state actors compete with the states on 
both the monopoly of legitimate use of force and on sovereignty.  Phil Williams 
states how these VNSA’s differ from each other and identifies 8 parameters to 
classify VNSA’s and distinguish them from each other. These are motivation and 
purpose, strength and scope, means to obtain funding or to access to resources, 
organizational structure, the role of violence for given groups, the relationship 
between VNSA and state authorities and finally the functions VNSAs fulfill for 
members and supporting constituencies. 36  Among them are warlords, militias, 
paramilitary forces, Insurgencies, criminal organizations, youth gangs and 
revolutionary groups et cetera. Jihadi groups all over the world fit into such 
description because of several reasons. Firstly, they aim to topple the regimes in 
Muslim countries that they call “apostates”. Thus, they behave like (an in fact, they 
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already are) revolutionary groups. By doing this, they challenge the Westphalian 
state-sovereign system and pose a threat to the monopoly of the state over the use of 
force. For Al-Qa’idah, because it is organized in several continents and 
subcontinents, it is generally accepted as a VNSA. 
Williams states that Al-Qa’idah has designated Saudi and Egyptian regimes as near 
enemies and United States as the far enemy. Moreover, he stresses that unlike local 
warlords, the group is organized in various countries and its relations with states 
vary considerably. 37  
Williams highlights that the group is transformed from a jihadi network to more of 
an umbrella organization and social movement, inspiring sympathetic individuals 
and groups but not controlling them.38 
Shaul and Rosenthal are two other scholars who regard jihadi groups as non-state 
actors. 39They link the threat posed to the state’s order and globalization thus they 
reckon that globalization has created gaps for jihadi groups to operate within.  
Furthermore, they claimed that while other organizations are adopting either 
hierarchical or network type organizational structures, Al-Qa’idah is organized in a 
typology called “ dune organization”40 They argued that dune organization is a type 
of organization which describes a strategic behavior that relies on a process of 
vacillation between territorial presence and a mode of disappearance. Territorial 
presence here points to a formation of a local entity like the nation state, global 
market, or ethnic community whereas disappearance tactics are closely tied to dune-
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like organization type where de-territorialization is being conducted. This gives 
them an opportunity to act like a freelance non-state actor from one territory to 
another and to change their modus operandi’s and adopt a convenient one according 
to the territory and the entity installed in it. Thus, Shaul and Rosenthal accept jihadi 
groups as VNSAs and allocate Al-Qa’idah a special place by describing its 
umbrella-like organization and claiming its novelty in organizational structure which 
they name as dune organization.  
Robert Bunker is another scholar who states that jihadi groups are violent non-state 
actors. In his study Bunker portrays a violent non-state actor continuum scheme and 
stations international jihadi organizations on the right end of the scheme that he calls 
“private armies”.41 
Furthermore, Bunker mentions that even though he puts such organization on the 
right hand where it marks “high corruption capability”, Al-Qa’idah  shows quite low 
corruption signs and capabilities.  He also states that such groups may transform 
their structural designs under a different sort of oppression or political/military 
atmosphere like from network to hierarchy to hybrid and so on.42 This also approves 
Mishal and Rosenthall’s de-territorialized organization approach. 
Barak Mendelsohn, on the other hand assesses the violent non-state actor threat to 
international society (IS) and the established state system and mainly focuses on 
jihadi organizations in the international system.43 He, too, emphasizes that jihadi 
groups are challenging sovereignty and targeting a state-oriented international 
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system but he includes international society as the challenged actor as well. Because 
his study is inspired by the English School of thought in the field of international 
relations, he brings this threat few steps further and acknowledges that jihadi groups 
in general indeed pose a threat not only to several states or to the sovereignty as a 
notion but most of all, to the international society that’s composed of sovereign 
states. In this respect, tension between the Qur’an’ic interpretation of international 
relations and positive international law did and will produce and fuel such attempts 
to change the international regime. 
Willian Roberto and Ana Melos accept jihadi groups like Hamas and The Islamic 
State as non-state military actors and attribute some of the sovereign state features to 
these entities.44 In their study, they bench mark local jihadi groups like Taleban and 
Hamas and they conclude that even though they get fed by the same source, they 
adopt identical narratives and they serve the same cause. Al-Qa’idah differed from 
other groups by the adoption of the transnational Islamic struggle focus which 
Hamas and Taleban could not mature in a similar manner. Fred Halliday also 
contributes to this argument and purports that although such groups have identical 
top-end goals and similar starting capabilities, Al-Qa’idah represents an exception 
by internationalizing very rapidly instead of remaining local. 45 James M. Smith 
classifies VNASs into two categories namely: “national non state actors” and “ non-
national non state actors”. He uses this level of analysis/ application based on 
strategic culture of a given non-state actor. For example in his study, Smith cites the 
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Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo as national non-state actor whereas he names Al-
Qa’idah as non-national non-state actor.46 He concludes that the given jihadi actor 
has identity, motive for war that constitutes its jus bellum iustum ( just war theory), 
ideology, strategy and et cetera. Thus Smith too, directly refers to Al-Qa’idah as a 
non-state actor. International relations academics overwhelmingly assert non-state 
actorhood of jihadi groups and very few, if any, academics object this opinion. 
Many of the studies stated that jihadi groups in general and Al-Qa’idah in particular 
operate with a well-organized experienced and highly complex core structure and 
command chain. There have been numerous debates and published publications 
regarding the type of organization that very entity has developed.  
Hierarchical structure, which suggests a direct vertical command line, network 
structure, that supposes more horizontal and sparsely but complex cells, hybrid and 
dune-like organizational schemes have been attributed to the given groups. 
Regardless of the type of organization, all of the experts cite that it is highly 
complex and internationally organized. 
Moreover, jihadi groups as non-state actors have their systematic ideologies and 
revolutionary aims and enough means to claim impact in international system as can 
be seen so far. Thus, it would be irrational to call such groups irrational as some 
scholars suggest.47 
Besides, jihadi movements in general show interest to interact with other non-state 
actors or states both directly and indirectly. It can be said that perhaps it would be 
convenient to call this “semi-diplomacy”.  As they claim to have a place in the 
international system, either pro-status quo like many separatist-nationalist groups in 
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general or revisionists like all revolutionary groups and jihadi groups, they use force 
in order to have a bargaining card and this consent-coercion nexus stemming from 
the use of force poses threat to the states sovereign system which is a descriptive 
label of VNAS’s. 
In conclusion, just as non-state actors in general are accepted as powerful actors in 
international system, so are jihadi groups equally accepted as non-state actors, even 
violent non-state actors in the view of that system.  Another point which has to be 
made is that the reason of mentioning Al- Qa’idah so much is that The Islamic State 
was originates from this group and the vast majority of academic studies conducted 
are concerned with it. Moreover, they carry same end –goals, same characteristics 
and are located in the same category group of VNSA’s. So, all studies that are made 
on the previous group in the sense of locating its whereabouts in international 
system equally befitt the latter. 
 
2.3. State of Art and Necessity for a New Theoretical Framework 
 
As can be noticed, there are two main problems regarding the international relations-
jihadist movements-non-state triangle. Firstly, it is clearly exhibited that there is no 
consensus whatsoever regarding the role and effectiveness of non-state actors in 
international relations. Thus, each and every grand and secondary international 
relations theory is either positively or negatively biased for non-state actors and this 
sets shadow over the reality on the field. 
Secondly, even though literature is agreed on the nature of Jihadi groups as non-state 
actor by consensus e, theories are either completely inapplicable to the notion in the 
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field or are partially ready to be applied. Thus there is a gap between grand theory 
narrations on non-state actors and the literature concerned with them. Therefore, it is 
quite risky to apply a theory on jihadi networks and their functioning methods if a 
deliberate study is sought. 
For this reason, this paperabstains from founding its pillars on one theory and 
applying it to study and understand the reality of the case in question. Instead, I 
adopted James Rosenau’s Turbulence opinion in international relations.  Based on 
this, I used Nina Caspersen’s reasoning methodology on competitive 
democratization and transformed it into “competitive jihadism” as a new term to be 
coined in order to better understand difference represented by The Islamic State and 
Al-Qa’idah examples. 
 
2.3.1 Turbulence Approach as a Theoretical Framework 
 
Rosenau states that the WTC attacks of September 11, 2001 caused a system 
perturbation so immense that for many observers it was an unprecedented radius-
changing event that transformed the systemic dynamics and moved them from local 
to national, supra national and systemic level. 48 According to Rosenau, concepts of 
change and transformation are undependable, sometimes untraceable.  
Rosenau’s turbulence approach has three systemic variables, distinguished by the 
levels of aggregation within which they operate. These are micro level, macro level 
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and micro-macro levels. 49 Rosenau states that, as at least two of these variables 
change simultaneously, world politics become susceptible and vulnerable to fall into 
turbulence.  The turbulence period of world politics is where theories adjusted and 
devised for static and stagnated periods fail to be of any effect and thus they have 
stopped to yield any beneficial knowledge since a long time as world politics went 
through a turbulence period.50  
 
 
2.3.1.1 The Micro Level Variable 
 
The micro level deals with non-public official individuals. The turbulence approach 
insists on that regardless of his or her social, economical, cultural or religious 
backgrounds, every single individual undergoes a continuing three-part skill 
revolution.51  These skills are highly transformative and able to shift. By doing so, 
they directly affect the capabilities of the individual. One of them is the analytical 
skill that helps them to bond with each other and track their roots and tails. Another 
one is the emotional skill that works to split into this part and that part of the event. 
For a deeper clarification, it asks the questions of “what for ?” and “ against what?” 
to the event or actor in order for them to deploy themselves into a feasible and 
acceptable stance.  The last dimension is the imaginative skill that helps a person to 
transcend certain limits of his or her imagination. Hereby, he or she can, by the help 
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of imaginative skills, discover and analyze other cultures. As a matter of fact, those 
who are rich in terms of capabilities are more skillful than those who are poor in 
analytical, emotional or imaginative dimensions.52 
These skills are upgradable and highly susceptible to social and educational 
interactions or actions. By saying this, Rosenau means that micro level variable is 
changeable and re-adjustable and that it creates biases or prejudices. So people may 
code some cultures, places and peoples and hand them in to next generations. 
‘Jewish is stingy’, ‘Islamic is fundamentalist’, ‘Mumbai’ is polluted, ‘German is 
disciplined’, ‘Hitler is evil’ and ‘Black is inferior’ are some examples for this kind 
of coding. 
 
2.3.1.2 The Macro Level Variable 
 
 
The second variable is the macro variable. Macro variable occurs where interactions 
are occurring and where there is a significant and visible mechanism. This, for a 
long time, was a dominant state-centric system whose anarchy has been an object of 
argument only very rarely. Because all means of governance like power of economy, 
army and policy were predominantly distributed among states, the system was to be 
considered as bipolar, multipolar , hegemonic or etc. By doing so, the role and 
power of all kinds of non-state actors were zeroed to the ground.  Today, according 
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to Rosenau, Non-governmental organizations, Inter Governmental Organizations 
and all kinds of non-state actors are challenging the state-centric international 
system. Thus, they are seizing power enough to change or channelize or at least 
affect the world politics. Rosenau cites World Trade Center attack conducted by 19 
Al-Qa’idah operatives as one of the milestones of this dramatic change.  
 It is clear that the state-centric system is no longer predominant and that the world 
system is undergoing a skill revolution. 53 This is referred to as ‘bifurcation’ by 
Rosenau who continues by emphasizing that today’s world politics is multi-centric 
and there are relatively autonomous actors on the ground.54 Today, states, the former 
champions of world politics, are facing two dangers. Firstly they are facing the 
threat posed by other states, which is classical threat perception. Novelty brought by 
the new systemic structure is another type of threat posed by non-state actors which 
Rosenau calls “ Threat from the other world”.55  
Macro level variable is the ultimate variable. It has direct links with the individual 
level by affecting and being affected at the same time.  
 
2.3.1.3 The Micro-Macro Level Variable 
 
 
The last variable is the micro-macro variable. This level basically points to a sort of 
interactions and linkages between micro-level individuals and macro-level systemic 
beings. Individual or collective stances of micro-level agents and positioning or 
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repositioning (be it co-operation, compensation, concession or objection) of macro-
level agents according to it designates the micro-macro variable’s bearing.  
According to Rosenau, individuals at the basic level are questioning the 
unquestioned hierarchical structures today and the complex supra level is going 
through a crisis. Because of these kinds of unconventional types of authority crisis, 
governments and state apparatus became more susceptible and less effective in re-
installing authority where it was lacking once. The issue here is not being able to 
quell an uprising by military and law-enforcement apparatus but it is that the state is 
losing ground to establish co-operations with individuals because individuals are 
now spotting the problems of governments and questioning their authorities; thus 
consequently withdrawing their full support. The Arab Spring uprisings, occupy 
movements, and similar protests in Hong Kong, Istanbul, Madrid, London, and 
Berlin can be read in this respect. 
To make it even clearer, the foundation of The Islamic State could be taken as an 
example. At the micro level, Iraqi Sunnite insurgents who have been radicalized by 
Maliki’s authoritarian policies and the Shia militants’ atrocities in Sunnite towns are 
the first group.  The second group at the micro level is the former Ba’ath officers 
who were wanted and lost their positions after Saddam was toppled. These two 
groups have constituted the majority of commanding and order-executing structure 
of The Islamic State at first place.  Their analytical skills are composed of few 
factors like losing fame, losing power, discrimination, feeling of betrayal and losing 
hope for a central state, the Peshmerga example, Jihadi call, and tribal system. 
Emotional skill here helped them to relocate themselves after Saddam’s toppling and 
Petraeus Plan combined with Maliki’s continuing sectarian and authoritarian policies 
at domestic realm. Thus, answer of “what for” question has changed drastically and 
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this pushed them to compose a new structure or join one. Their imaginative skills are 
also affected by this trauma and the recent experience of a fragmented minority 
(especially after the first 2005 elections).  
Macro variable is the systemic, which caused the rise of new players in Iraq, in West 
Asia and in world politics after 9/11 attacks. One of them are militant groups like the 
significantly successful Peshmerga or pro Shia -sectarian Quds Force, Badr 
Brigades and Muqtada Al Sadr Brigades which are now taking place in Iraqi 
politics. In the Middle East, Al-Qa’idah was escalating and discourses of Al-
Qa’idah and Iraqi insurgent militias were nearly identical. In the global scale too, 
Al-Qa’idah was a non-state player. Moreover non-state actors and their struggles 
against well-established state forces show that state-centrism is in crisis and unable 
to offer a solution in such cases.   
Roseanu’s turbulence approach also helps us to understand The Islamic State’s 
reality. While the macro-level created sovereignty of Syria and Iraq and their 
statehood claims that they are recognized in international relations realm, micro 
level produced The Islamic State’s reality as well as its sovereignty and identity 
building process. A relationship between them points to a change in micro-macro 
level balance. Explaining this relationship will open a door to understand the reality 
behind a fact which is not explained by grand theories. Turbulence approach is a 
useful tool as to understand why The Islamic State is launching a state building 
program or performing powerful propaganda campaigns. The shift in balance 
between micro and macro areas created enough room in which The Islamic State 
may conduct its campaigns. Secondly, it commenced to challenge its patron states in 
discourse fields as well, in order to attract more attention and consolidate its 
sovereignty by showing its target audience its will. As Caspersen stated similar 
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pattern before for de facto state- democratization nexus, this approach emulates it 
with respect to jihadi de facto state-jihadist policies nexus. Thus, “competitive 
jihadism” can be best explained by the aforementioned turbulence approach. 
 
2.3.2 Competitive Processes: Competitive Democratization and 
Competitive Jihadism  
 
 
A competitive process, at first points to a race, a competition among two or 
more parties whose ultimate reach is generally the same. This competition can be 
about acquiring recognition, a right over some sources, (like competing right in 
International Law, International Sea Law) over votes, attendants, et cetera. 
Moreover, its nature can be a zero sum game or non-zero sum game varying from 
one scenario to another. In this section, a widely used notion, competitive 
democratization, will be accepted and will be modified for the subject of the Thesis 
under the title of “ Competitive Jihadism” in order to shed a light onto the 
diversification of policies and their outcomes which belong to The Islamic State and 
the Syria-Iraq parent state axis. 
 
2.3.2.1 Competitive Democratization 
 
 
Democratization, as Linz and Stepan argued, is a complex process that 
includes transition and consolidation phases. These are namely the power of issuing 
new executable policies, determination of administration by popular and free voting 
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and a sufficient consensus on the political procedure.56 Moreover, economic and 
political freedoms are inseparably bound to each other and economic freedom 
supports and promotes humans to express their beliefs and opinions and their 
problems in an atmosphere free of fear or concern about their freedoms .57 These 
requirements and their sub-elements unarguably affect the identity of a state or a de 
facto state in both ways: domestic identity and foreign identity. 
Maybe the greatest signs of the impact of democracy over the international system is 
UN Charter’s spirit of which opening words are “ We the Peoples” 58 59  and 
discourses perennially expressed by leaders regarding the role of democracy. Thus, 
it can be said that today’s world politics’ main engine is democracy in the sense of 
type of ruling the states. It also facilitates the recognition of a newly founded state or 
a political entity, namely a de facto state. 
Many non-state actors, and predominantly de facto states use this legitimate key to 
get into broader interaction with their counterparts and gain legitimacy in this sense.  
According to Nina Caspersen, these non-state actors changed their recognition 
programs since the end of the Cold War as the shift of the world politics occurred in 
favor of democracy and liberation.60 Even though such entities are pervasively seen 
as a source of instability, militarism, criminality and competition over some pieces 
of land run by warlords, they are actually at the threshold of the state-building 
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process and hence they expect and struggle for international recognition. According 
to Caspersen, their primal strategy is to adopt internationally accepted “ hegemonic 
international values” i.e. democracy.61  
Democracy and democratization are so influential that scholars use them as tools 
that contribute to the process of recognition. According to Broers, non-recognized 
states are playing a competitive democratization quest. This rivalry takes place 
between non-recognized states and their parent states where the non-recognized state 
(de facto state) tries to prove that it surpasses its parent state in terms of democracy 
62 Moreover, they are keen to display themselves as the “democracy islands” in the 
authoritarian waters.63 As a matter of fact, this democratization competition is so 
vital for some cases that parent states raise this issue against non-state actors in order 
to display them as illegitimate beings in terms of public support and their separatist 
motives. 64  Especially some Post-Soviet de facto states got into democratization 
competition with their parent states and used this competitive democratization 
process in order to gain recognition.65 In sum, de facto states are avid to refer to 
democratization as a strategy and competitive democratization as a tool to gain 
recognition.66 
Succinctly, there are certain notions (democracy, human rights, legitimacy), certain 
audiences (third party states), certain agents (non-state actor, parent state,) and a 
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certain designated outcome (either recognition or non-recognition). This pattern is 
the grand pattern of competitive processes and I argue that it is applicable to the 
notion I call “ competitive jihadism” as well. 
2.3.2.2 Competitive Jihadism 
 
 
The ultimate goal of a non-recognized state is to gain recognition by the 
international community through which that non-recognized state seeks its 
legitimacy. This proposal is also valid for the Islamic State as a pattern. The Islamic 
State too, seeks its recognition but the target group this time is not the international 
community, naturally, it is Islamic World in general.  
Although their sources of legitimacy are different, an ordinary de facto state and The 
Islamic State share the same methodology and ultimate goal. Tension between 
parent state and de facto state for a regular incident like Moldova-Transnistria exists 
between The Islamic State and the group that begot it and between the Islamic State 
and its parent states.  
Caspersen states that when a de facto state is born, it seeks recognition in order for 
survival and adopts a democratic narration in order to attract the approval of 
international community by competing with its parent states in democratization. The 
Islamic State too, as a de facto state, is involved in competition with its parent states 
which are Iraq and Syria. But this competition does not contain democratic notions 
but rather jihadi notions because of the target audience being the Islamic State not 
the international community like other de facto states but it is generally Islamic 
community. This situation causes an inevitable tension and this tension is also 
present between The Islamic State and the Iraq-Syria axis. It is clear that non-
recognized states develop narrations in order to the stricten bond within the target 
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audience and many times it shows up in the form of nationalism like in the example 
of Abkhazia and Nagorno-Qarabakh67 or in the form of socialism like in the example 
of Transnistria68 and sometimes in the form of Islamism like in the example of 
Imarat Kavkaz in North Caucasus according to their ideologies. Tension created by 
the difference in methodology and priorities between two groups are now displaying 
a clear example for tension between a parent state and non-recognized states today. 
Moreover, just as de facto states attempt to create a new society customized 
according to its ideology, the Islamic State too redesigns its target audience by 
claiming a Caliphate in order to legitimate its claim in the eyes of the Muslim 
community. It should be noted that adopting this narration is also important because 
the Islamic State needs to attract more fighters to fight alongside.  
Another characteristic of a non-recognized state is to go into a heavy 
institutionalization period in order to prove its capability of being able to be a state.  
According to Caspersen, these entities go through 3 overlapping steps. 69The first 
step is gaining psychical control over territories that  is accomplished by all of the de 
facto states. The second one is having a credible defense capability and monopoly of 
the use of force. Third one is creating internal sovereignty. Keeping the examples of 
Chechnya of Dzohar Dudayev and Imarat Kavkaz of Dokku Umarov, Transnistria , 
TRNC and pre-independence Kosovo in mind will help to test the hypothesis. For 
example, militia forces of Kosovo before independence held a considerable part of 
the country in control as they united under the banner of UÇK ( Usthria Çlirimtare e 
Kosovës—) and  UÇK constituted the defense forces of Kosovo. Under the UN 
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watch, Kosovar people got ready for self-rule and they announced Kosovo as a 
sovereign state. Chechnya has gone through the same process although not as 
successful as the one in  Kosovo. The Islamic State, today is going through the same 
process in a much more limited time and more hostile environment despite its lack 
of experience whatsoever. Yet, it surprisingly still managed to take control of some 
considerable parts of Syria and Iraq in few years and has undeniable defense forces 
as police and military forces. Moreover, The Islamic State is going through a rapid 
institutionalization period where it is building an army, opening schools and 
universities, founding courts, opening factories and paving roads, let alone forming 
an army.  Just like any de facto state would like to prove its competence against its 
parent state over such points, The Islamic State is trying to prove its competence in 
the Iraq-Syria axis as well as other nations. 
Another particularization of non-recognized states is their inclination for 
propagating themselves by any means possible. This can be by the means of 
diaspora, third party states, and media or by action. For example, TRNC used the 
help of the Republic of Turkey to gain recognition and especially Muslim countries 
were the targets in Turkey’s campaign. Nagorno-Karabakh had the help of Armenia 
and the Armenian diaspora for recognition as a state albeit futile it was. For The 
Islamic State, media is the primal choice of propaganda due to which it was banned 
to propagate The Islamic State in nearly every state and had no recognized state to 
advocate it. Thus, The Islamic State put an unprecedented effort on media 
campaigning in order to gain sympathy and attract the attention of its target group, 
Muslim communities in all over the world.  The Islamic State utilized especially 
social media means like Twitter, YouTube, Facebook (it formed its own 
5elefabook.com afterwards) and countless websites, personal blogs and websites for 
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news. It uploaded HD Videos and documentaries like “Flames of War” or “Saleel as 
Sawareem” in order to propagate themselves. The Islamic State espoused media war 
idea from the very first days and invested and depended on it in a great scale so 
much so that it attracted the attention of media outlets.7071  
Succinctly put, from territorial defense to creating necessary institutions, to public 
service to adopting a narration for legitimacy and to propagating their ideas, The 
Islamic State is displaying the identical behaviors and methods in order to achieve 
the similar top-end goal: recognition. Although an ordinary non-recognized state 
competes against her parent states by these means, The Islamic State is competing 
against its parent states (Iraq and Syria) and for the recognition, recruiting and 
gaining supremacy over them. Maybe the only difference here is while the former is 
acting in the frames of International Law for recognition, producing discourses 
defined in this system and competing its parent state in competitive democratization 
process, the latter is acting according to the Islamic Shari’a law , producing 
discourses defined in Islamic system and competing its parent states in competitive 
jihadism process. This clearly shows that they differentiate their target audience that 
is namely the international community for the former and the Islamic Community 
for the latter. For both entities, it is important to prove the target audiences they are 
actually more eligible in the system in which they are defined (democracy and 
Islam). Thus, by competitive jihadism, The Islamic State is competing with its 
parent states in order to attract attention, recruit jihadist and empower itself in order 
to fulfill its primal instinct: Survival.  
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Competitive democratization framed by Nina Caspersen and competitive jihadism 
fact for jihadi de facto states is accepted within micro-macro level of Rosenau’s 
turbulence approach. According to Rosenau, it is not possible to understand world 
politics without bearing micro-macro level conceptualization in mind. As for Theory 
making process regarding jihadi de facto states in particular and de facto states in 
general, while de facto state level is micro level, de-jure states is macro level. 
However, it is compulsory to define the relationship between micro and macro level 
and thus the notion of competitive jihadism is presented. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
3.1. Research Design 
 
 
 
In the previous chapter, the importance of non-state actors in international relations 
literature and its place in theoretical approaches were covered and the term 
“competitive jihadism” is coined in order to explain why The Islamic State is 
involved in state building efforts and is using Jihadist propaganda. Studying a de 
facto state that is in all-out war with all the states obligates several restrictions upon 
the researcher. One of them is that it is not possible to observe the entity firsthand 
and to conduct research or interviews. It poses life risk and is illegal. Thus, this 
restriction brings limitations. Secondly, the ideology and policy, jihad and jihadism, 
are abundantly discussed. Hence there is no one definition on which all sides are 
agreed. There are disputes between Muslims and non-Muslims, few contemporary 
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scholars and predeceasing scholars of Islam and among Islamic sects. Thus, instead 
of appointing what is the most agreed upon,  the norm jihad  is referred  as the 
Islamic State refers to it in order to provide a norm matching and avoid conceptual 
tumult. 
 
 
3.1.1 Conceptualizing the Terms 
 
For jihadi de facto states, terminology to be employed is of peak importance 
in order to attract the attention of the targeted masses. For the Islamic State and its 
policies, the terms jihad , jihadism and jihadist policy are to be conceptualized in 
order to avoid possible confusions.  
Jihad is a highly articulated notion in Islamic sources. It originates from the Arabic 
root “jaahada” literally meaning, “ He strived”. However, in prophetic narrations 
and in Qur’anic verses it can be seen to be loaded up with a new meaning that can 
mostly be understood as “ qitaal” or to fight.  The concept of jihad was born young 
in the Verses revealed during the Meccan period of revelation; it grew and matured 
among the Muslims who found a city-state in Medina. For example it is said in the 
Qur’an “Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but do not transgress. Indeed. 
Allah does not like transgressors.” 72  Continues as following “ And kill them 
wherever you overtake them and expel them from wherever they have expelled you, 
and trial and turbulence is worse than killing. And do not fight them at al-Masjid al- 
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Haram until they fight you there. But if they fight you, then kill them. Such is the 
recompense of the disbelievers.” 73  
A prominent scholar, Ibn Qayyim Ibn Jawziyyah categorized jihad in four categories 
as follows: 
a) jihad against hyporcrites 
b) jihad against non-muslims 
c) jihad against the devil 
d) jihad against the self74  
Thus he placed actual warfare in the first two categories as opposed to inner war in 
the last two categories. However, Ibn Qayyim Ibn Jawziyyah states that actual 
warfare also contributes to one’s inner war against his self.75 
One of the most renowned scholars of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), Imam al Shafi’i 
stated jihad in his Al-‘Umm referring to it in the sense of fighting.7677  Another 
prominent scholar of Islamic jurisprudence, Imam al Mâlik described jihad as “a 
Muslim waging war against a non-Muslim who has no peace agreement with 
Muslims and the fighting is for the sake of the word of Allah to prevail. Jihad is also 
fighting the non-Muslim who attacks Muslim territory and it is also the Muslims 
attacking the non-Muslims in their land.”78 
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Shaykhulislam Ibn Taymiyyah also stated the same meaning of jihad in his letters to 
the people of Dimashk and told them that it is the pinnacle of Islam.79 Although 
there are articulations as to greater jihad being one’s inner war instead of actual 
fighting, one of the early scholars, Ibn Nuhaas stated that such narration is invalid 
and wasn’t narrated by any credible narrators in his book Mashari al Ashwaq ila 
masaari al ushaaq wa mutheer al gharaam ila daar assalaam, which is completely 
dedicated to the topic of jihad.80 
Western scholars, on the other hand, stress the “inner war” dimension of jihad and 
promote one’s self struggle. Diane Morgan states that Muslim and non-Muslim 
scholars agree on that the term jihad carries two legitimate meanings: inner spiritual 
effort and outer physical effort against the enemy.81 However, it is crystal clear that 
the Islamic State has adopted the opinions of Muslim scholars over the Western 
Tasawuf-oriented inner war claim. 
The right of waging war and its conditions are also regulated in Islamic 
jurisprudence. A renown scholar of Hanafi jurisprudence of Islam, Ibn Qudamah, 
stated in his book that jihad is the responsibility of the ruler and the ruler is 
independent to decide whether to wage it or not. Once call is made, it is obligatory ( 
Fardh) on believers to obey.82 Imam Sharbini , Bin Baz, Nasuriddin el Elbani, Al 
Sharkasi and other renown scholars also stated the same opinion from all 
jurisprudence and sects of Islamic belief. Imam Sharbini said that when a leader 
fortifies the frontiers, arms his commanders and takes the lead, it becomes 
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applicable. 83 Imam Sharkasi said that the leader of Muslims must exert his best 
effort to lead an army himself and trust in God to get aided for victory.84  
It can be said that the most promoted dimension of jihad is to war in verses, by 
hadiths and by the scholarly books as conceptualized above. Jihadism, on the other 
hand is an all-out warring ideology based on main pillars of Islamic thoughts that 
promote the use of force either with defensive or offensive manners in order to either 
expand “Dar-ul Islam85” or defend it. (Also can be stated as Al Jihad Bi sayf ) 
Thus, in this thesis the term jihad refers to the meaning accepted by the Islamic State 
due to it is the only way to analyze jihadi policies of the Islamic State and in order to 
avoid a probable tumult. Clearly, jihad refers to a notion which is to war either to 
expand the territory of the Islamic land or to defend it against an offensive launched 
by non-Muslims. In this study, Jihadism is conceptualized as implementing and 
launching jihad as a primal foreign policy of an Islamic state. 
The Jihadist policy is the tool for implementing ideology (jihadism) by the help of 
the cause and strategy (jihad). It is safe to argue that a state policy should be 
customized fittingly in order to be called a jihadist policy. First of all, the ruler or 
elite of a state’s discourse is sought for. Jihadist discourse constitutes a very 
powerful jihadist policy indicator. This is to say whether proven by action or not, a 
discourse that contains jihadist content is a jihadist policy. Secondly, because jihad 
is an active engagement, it requires an opponent. Thus, designating an enemy and an 
ultimate goal should be consistent with the ideology adopted in this case. Thus, the 
relation between the jihadist discourse and the designated enemy displays whether it  
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is a jihadist policy if the correlation is positive. Thirdly, the jihadist policy should 
also be sought in internal system of a state. An educational system, constitutional 
system and press releases dedicated to jihadi aims constitute powerful indicators of a 
jihadist policy. Finally, there should be no contradiction between ultimate goal, 
discourse and actions as to reach that aim.   
3.1.2 The Hypothesis 
 
The Islamic State has a rather dynamic profile in the field. Although it is a newly 
proclaimed state, its statements regarding the state policies are mostly offensive and 
radical. Its institutionalization is going very rapidly and the call for migration is 
made very repeatedly. However this growing effect of The Islamic State is occurring 
on the expense of its parent states and other groups in the field. Consequently, 
discourses made my officials are also warring alongside the fighters in the field.  
I accept this clash between The Islamic State and its parent states as a zero-sum 
game. Hereby, the gain of one is the loss of the other and positive for one is negative 
for the other. It is true especially when the content of speeches of officials and 
policies of authorities are challenging each other. I picked the “jihadism” topic 
among these controversies as a research topic. Hence, my hypothesis to be tested is 
as follows:  
Hypothesis: “If a Jihadist de facto entity adopts a more jihadist policy than its 
parent state,  jihadi de facto state consolidates its sovereignty.” 
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3.1.3. Dependent Variable 
 
Main dependent variable of this hypothesis is the consolidation of sovereignty which 
encompasses population, size of territory, law enforcement forces and 
institutionalism as its indicators. 
 
 
3.1.3.1. Consolidation of Sovereignty 
 
 Sovereignty in international terminology is not a term clearly agreed upon in terms 
of definition. According to Wolff, it is “the right to command and correlatively the 
right to be obeyed.”86 But in terminology, sovereignty harbors numerous components 
and champions of each component devised another definition for the term 
sovereignty. 
Sovereignty comes along with being supreme and it is repeatedly stated as a notion 
that is absolute. Alan James argues that sovereignty cannot be non-absolute and 
supreme at the same time in one entity.87 However this perception is being criticized 
today as the European Union example is alive in which members are in absolute 
sovereignty of some functions of the state apparatus while they are in non-absolute 
sovereignty of some.88  Another form of distinction concerning the definition of 
                                               
 
86 R.P.Wolff. , The Conflict Between Authority and Autonomy, Basil Blackwell Press, Oxford, 1990, p.20 
87  Alan James, “The Practice of  Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society” Political Studies 47(3) pp.457 
pp.462-464 
88 Sovereignty, “Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy”,  First published Sat May 31, 2003; substantive revision Tue Jun 8, 
2010 , Retrieved 02.04.2015 ,” http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty”  
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sovereignty stems from its feature of being external or internal. According this 
definition, while internal sovereignty points the Westphalian Sovereignty, external 
sovereignty points the situation where outsiders ( i.e. other states) accept an entity  
as sovereign and showing respect to its borders and internal issues.89 
In positive international Law, sovereignty is described and its definition of 
sovereignty is agreed upon by the states. The Montevideo Convention on Rights and 
Duties of States (1933), Article 1 explicitly defines the notion and the components. 
         “The State as a person of International law should possess the following 
qualifications:  
(a) a permanent population 
(b) a defined territory 
(c) a government and 
(d) capacity to enter into relationship with other states.”90 
It is understandable that the definition made by the League of Nations is state-centric 
because no single authority welcomes a de facto entity in expense of sovereign state 
system. Moreover, in international law theory there are two approaches to explain 
the birth of a new state and its recognition. One of them requires a general 
recognition whereas more accepted one states that it is only a matter of 
announcement.91So, once a state is announced, its existence and meeting sine-qua-
non requirements, general recognition is not sought for anymore. Turkish Republic 
of Northern Cyprus is a good model to understand what is a sovereign entity that 
lacks international recognition. 
                                               
 
89 loc.cit. 
90 League	of	Nations	Treaty	Series,	vol.	165,	pp.	20-43. 
91 Hüseyin Pazarcı, Uluslararası Hukuk, Turhan Kitabevi, Ankara 2013, p.127, p.127 
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Apart from state-centric international law definitions, scholars generally accept that 
de facto states meet many requirements to be called as sovereign. They enjoy the 
internal sovereignty92, albeit not external, they perceive themselves as equipped with 
the capability and desire of entering into relations with other states 93  and gain 
recognition at the end. This paper accepts The Islamic State as a de facto state and 
accepts that The Islamic State fulfills all the requirements to be labeled as one 
including the lack of recognition by de-jure states. The Islamic State, by many 
aspects displays the characteristics of a de facto state. 
Firstly, it fits the definition made by scholars with exception of seeking recognition 
from other states without conceding its position and status. As not all the de facto 
states seek integration into modern state system, The Islamic State has set a 
completely different agenda with different priorities and different target audiences. 
However, this situation does not vitiate the de facto statehood of any entity. 
Secondly, The Islamic State shows the features of a de facto state in its internal 
policies as well. Like its other peers, it started to build original and necessary 
institutions ranging from universities, hospitals, bridges, fully functional courts,  
police forces specialized for women and ministries. This is a classic policy to be 
conducted by every de facto state. 
Thirdly it has a comprehensive and coherent domestic policy and these policies are 
strictly abided by. This indicates that entity enjoys an order that it adopted itself as a 
                                               
 
92 Perceptions of  Security & Governance in De-Facto and Partially-Recognized States” UCL Department of Political Science , 
School of Public Policy, Published on 08.09.2014, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/spp-news/080914  Retrieved 02.04.15 
93 Scott Pegg, De Facto States in the International System , Institue of International Relations The University of British 
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system to be applied. Just as an ordinary de facto state may adopt socialism or 
liberal democracy, The Islamic State adopted religious based Sharia system. 
Fourthly, it has an anthem, a flag, a capital city, a professional bureaucratic structure 
and it is minting coins from golden, silver and copper.  All these indicators show 
that The Islamic State is showing symptoms of a future Khilafa (Caliphate). 
This paper accepts controlling a defined territory, establishing government, 
establishing order (by coercion and consent) and capacity to enter into relationship 
with other entities (states or NSA’s) as indicators. In other words, the most agreed 
on indicators in the literature are selected. 
For scaling and gauging the consolidation of sovereignty of The Islamic State, I use 
available data sources and focus on the dates between 2013-2015. Although The 
Islamic State proclaimed its statehood in 2014, the year 2013 is also included 
because The Islamic State started to rule a certain territory since this date on. On the 
other hand, states generally are not enthusiastic about establishing diplomatic 
relations with de facto entities. The Islamic State carries both of these attributions. It 
is undeniably a de facto state and employs an offensive discourse at its maximum. 
Thus, its capability and/or willingness for the establishment of diplomatic relations 
with other states are improbable. Based on this, I disregard the fourth verse of 
definition of the  League of Nations in this study.   
 
 3.1.3.2 A certain and credible size of territory.   
 
There should be a certain portion of soil under the rule of competing entity and this 
territorial size should make sense to be called a “country”.  This is one of the sine-
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qua-non conditions of being a state.94 Any de facto state emerges with de facto and 
de jure territorial claims and tries to consolidate its sovereignty within these borders. 
Therefore, territory is the first aim of such an entity. Territorial claims may differ in 
accordance with the characteristics of the state. If a de facto state bases its narrations 
and claims on ethnicity such as TRNC or Abkhazia, its borders are determined 
accordingly. If it is a historical or ideological de facto state, its borders take shape in 
that sense like in Transnistria or Imarat Kavkaz. But in any case, a heartland is a 
natural prerequisite for a de facto state. For this study, this territory is defined by the 
Raqqah-Mosul-Anbar triangle as the core and annexes are also taken in calculation 
where available and necessary. 
3.1.3.3. A credible size of population 
 
Another variable is the size of population within the given territory. If the correlation 
between the time and size of the population is positive, then it could be argued that 
de facto entity is displaying a desirable semblance to its target audience. The 
population may change with production and migration from other states and both of 
them show the success of a de facto state in the sense of population. However, in 
this thesis, instead of the number of foreign fighters who joined the ranks of The 
Islamic State, I accepted the number of civilian population as the variable.  
 3.1.3.4. A potent security and law enforcement force 
 
  Yet another variable is the presence of security force and law –enforcements 
forces. Existence of such force is a positive contribution for consolidation of a de 
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facto state and as Caspersen stated, many of de facto states are heavily militarized.95 
Generally speaking regular army and specialized security forces bear more positive 
outcomes than untidy forces and militias. Thus in this paper, potent security and law 
enforcement forces meant the following:  
(a) An Armed force with regular command chain 
(b) Internal security force (i.e. Gendarme or Police) 
(c) Specialized security forces (Intelligence or other specialized fields) 
These forces should be able to defend the borders and establish the internal 
upheavals during turmoil and should be able to cast enough deterrence during 
internal peace periods.  
3.1.3.5 Institutionalization 
 
Institutionalization is one of the most important indicators of the statehood and a 
significant supporter of the claim of sovereignty. In fact, building state-like 
institutions is the top priority for de facto states.96 Per se, this process may be split 
into two subgroups. The first groups of institutions are the static ones and the second 
group is the dynamic one. 
The dynamic condition refers to ideology, regime type, type of social, economic 
program, political agenda foreign policy strategy.  Jeffrey Checkel states that, for de 
facto states, it is a greater chance that administrative elite has visible impact on the 
identity of the state comparing to a de-jure state.97 Hashim Tachi and Kosovo-before 
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announcement of the independence-, Milorad Dodik and Republica Srpska can be 
given as examples) Thus, if a de facto state is willing to adopt democracy as its own 
political system, it starts to build its parliament, issue laws and constitution, set up 
elections in democratic sense and so forth. But the absence of these would not harm 
the claim of de facto statehood. 
The second one is the static condition, which refers to the necessary institutions. 
These are sine-qua-non for a state in the sense of 21st century. These institutions are 
necessary in order to establish and maintain the social, political and security 
requirements of the population and are important for the validity and the survival of 
the de facto state. These are armed forces, adequate education institutions, a 
constitution and legal mechanism of state apparatus, courts, symbols of the state 
(money, flag, anthem et cetera) and web of administration. 
 
3.1.4. Independent Variables 
This thesis accepts statements and releases of the Islamic State and Iraq and Syrian 
governmental bodies as independent variables. 
 
3.1.4.1.Statements and Releases of The Islamic State.  
  
As has been clearly explained in second chapter of this study, while ordinary de 
facto states propagate themselves in order to attract positive attention over their 
parent states, The Islamic State propagates its ideas and aims in order to attract 
Muslims instead of aiming to get the sympathy of the international society. In doing 
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so, The Islamic State uses various methods to disseminate its propagations. Below is 
a list of these instruments: 
 
(a) Fatawa of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, The Caliph 
(b) Fatawa & Speeches of Abu Muhammad Al Adnani, The Spokesman of The Islamic 
State ( See Annex ) 
(c) Video Releases.  
(d)  Dabiq Magazine and ISR & ISN Periodicals. 
In order to designate the propagation and to gauge the policy of leaders of The 
Islamic State, the aforementioned sources are examined and. Jihadist attitude of The 
Islamic State is assessed. 
 
3.1.4.2. Statements and Releases of Parent States  
 
This study focuses on the competition between The Islamic State and its parent 
states, which are the Republic of Iraq98 and the Syrian Arab Republic99. Therefore, 
Jihadist discourses and policies of Iraq and Syria are examined in order to make a 
comparison with The Islamic State. 
The following sources are used in order to get available data concerning the jihadist 
attitudes of the parent states:   
a) Official Statements made by Head of States 
b) Official Statements made by Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
                                               
 
98 From now on may be used as Iraqi Government or Iraqi Authorities et cetera. 
99 
 From now on may be used as Syrian Government or Syrian Authorities et cetera 
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c) Public Releases regarding Jihadism 
d) Miscellaneous official materials concerning Jihadism ( i.e. Treaties, website 
releases, reports) 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
DE-FACTO vs  DE-JURE 
 
 
 
  
4.1. Historical Background: Rise of The Islamic State 
 
On May 16, 2010 The New York Times Newspaper mentioned the name  “Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi” as a name of a man who got in charge of a nearly neutralized group 
called The Islamic State of Iraq. Newspaper released this news like every other news 
and passed the name of al-Baghdadi on the fourth paragraph as the following:  
“Unlike past statements that were often replete with florid language, Sunday’s 
announcement was subdued. It said the group had named Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi al-
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Husseini al-Qurashi as the new leader after consultations with the group’s leaders, 
influential people and “opinion makers.”” 100 
 Born in 1971, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is a PhD holder in Islamic Studies from the 
University of Islamic Sciences in Baghdad. He was described by his friends as quiet, 
attached to the mosque, retiring, excellent as soccer player, owner of scholarly 
manners and very far away from displaying fanatic behaviors.101  
Although he was a quiet person and established his own Islamic faction called “Jaish 
Ahl-as Sunnah wal Jama’ah”.102 This caused him to end up in Bucca detention camp 
until December 2004. Although he joined the Mujahideen Shura Council  in 2007 , 
he didn’t enjoy the idea of lingering amidst diversified ideas rather than a monobloc 
organization. 
According to Iraqi security specialist Al-Hashimi, al-Baghdadi’s ascension to ISI 
leadership was nearly agreed upon, 9 out of 11 votes of Shura Council because of 
three reasons; 103Firstly, He is from Quraish Tribe that is a very eminent tribe among 
Middle Eastern nations thanks to it is made mention in a prophetic narration as the 
tribe all caliphs will come from. 104 Secondly, he himself was from the Shura 
Council, so he was not an outsider to organization and its mechanism or goals. 
                                               
 
100  Shadid, Anthon ( May 16, 2010) , “ Iraqi Insurgent Group Names New Leaders”, 
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Thirdly, he was the youngest member and was charismatic. They believed that he 
could bring dynamism to the ISI. 
After he took office in ISI, he pledged his alliance to Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Emir 
of al-Qa’idah. Then, he sought professional strategists and people who lost their jobs 
and titles and furthermore who shared same enemies with himself (Shi’a and West). 
At this juncture, al-Baghdadi aligned with former components of Ba’ath Party in 
Iraq. 
Ba’ath 105 Movement and Jihadi movement both suffered from Shi’ite sectarianism 
and US invasion and this caused members of two groups to end up in detention 
camps where marriage of these two ideologies happened between 2008-2010.106 As 
the main driving force behind ever growing The Islamic State administration, 
Ba’athists and jihadists shared fundamental grounds. They had common enemies on 
which they converge on and Islam’s role both as religion (jihadism) and culture 
(Ba’ath) brought them under the same banner. 
Influx of ex-military and intelligence personnel helped ISI to reshape its capabilities 
and differentiate itself from other jihadi groups in administration, professionalism, 
scope, militant number and capability of conducting fatal operations. These features 
made ISI unchallenged among Sunni militant groups whereas Shi’ites were 
organizing under the banner of Muqtada al-Sadr, Quds Force and Badr Brigades. 
Barrett claims that this collaboration between ex-Ba’ath members and jihadists 
within ISI (and later on ISIS) was actually a competition and Ba’athists had the 
                                               
 
105 Meaning “Resurrection” in Arabic Language 
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upper hand in the administration of ISI until 2011 although jihadist wing took over 
the leadership later on.107 
ISI started to carry out deadly attacks in Iraq after a long time of solitude and 
regeneration. In 2011, ISI made its first coordinated attacks after US withdrawal and 
attacked 14 different security points leaving 69 dead108 and 25 more right after a 
secondary attack just after US DoD officially labeled al-Baghdadi as a terrorist and 
put 20 Million USD bounty on his head.109 In September 2012, ISI raided Tikrit 
prison, bombed cars in Baghdad and by the help of these attacks, regained a 
dominant role in Iraq especially right after US troops withdrew from Iraqi soil. All 
these attacks were a part of a year –long plan called “ Breaking the Walls” launched 
in July 2012.110 Main objective was to retake the territory that AQI once was over 
control and repelled and secondary objective was to terrorize the capital Baghdad so 
keeping Shi’ite busy and alerted especially in vicinity of Baghdad.  
Meanwhile, opposition movements in the Syrian Arab Republic were quite 
strengthened by the end of 2012. Already being supported by Al-Qa’idah core and 
gained immense power, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi wanted to be involved in the Syrian 
civil war. However, in order to not alienate local people,, ISI agreed to subordinate 
itself under the Syrian branch of Al-Qai’dah  to avoid  its hostility. Yet another 
reason for such a venture was capturing the oil revenues of Syria and benefitting 
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from Syrian youth ready to be recruited .as well as expanding the Iraqi front by 
abolishing Iraqi-Syrian border, also known as Sykes-Picot Border. Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi sent one of his top commanders, being also his friend from Camp Bucca, 
Abu Muhammad Al- Julani111 with money and fighters to Syria to form the Syrian 
front of ISI. In January 2012 Al-Julani founded “Jabhat Al Nusra Li Ahli Ssham” 
(mostly known as Jabhat al Nusra,)112 Within a very short period of time, Jabhat al 
Nusra  gained great success and became one of the most powerful factions in the 
field and performed the most rapid growth especially in the Battle of Aleppo in early 
2012 alongside with other insurgent groups. Upon conducting a very successful 
campaign in Syria, Jabhat al Nusra  became the most popular insurgent front in Syria 
in the first quarter of 2013 and therefore, al-Baghdadi’s ISI released a voice record 
on the internet promulgating  the merging of Jabhat al Nusra  with  ISI113. However 
this monumental moment was the date when The Islamic State of Iraq and Levant 
was proclaimed. Although Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri tried to be a mediator between 
two groups, his ties with ISIS were evidently severed in February 2014.   
The year 2013 was the full throttle period of al-Baghdadi’ s group both in Syria and 
Iraq. In July, ISIS started to conduct their second policy in Iraq whose name was “A 
soldier’s Harvest” that aimed to assassinate and neutralize the Iraqi security forces 
and expand the territory under the control of ISIS. Similar policy was also being 
implemented in Syria not only against Asad’s Regime Forces114 but also other jihadi 
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groups like Ahrar Al Sham115 and Jabhat al Nusra especially in Aleppo and Raqqah, 
which then became the capital city of The Islamic State,. After a successful blitz 
war, ISIS claimed control over the Mosul in June 2014116 and annexed this territory 
by claiming the abolishment of Sykes-Picot Borders.117  Just few days after this 
shock, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the new state called” The Islamic State” 
and the re-installation of the prophesied Khilafa118 
From that time on, many milestones have happened for two de-iure states and for 
one de facto one. Beheading of James Foley, setting Jordanian pilot on fire, 
appearances of John Cantlie several times, siege of Ayn Al ‘Arab 119 , coalition 
airstrikes, assault of Iraqi ground forces with Shite militias against The Islamic State 
and so on. Nevertheless Islamic self-proclaimed Khilafa still controls vast 
geography, several million population and tens of thousands of armed force.   
After having introduced newly founded Islamic-de facto- State, I will proceed to 
analyze jihadi discourses of The Islamic State and Iraq-Syria Axis in the following 
chapter. 
 
 
                                               
 
115 Formed by Hasan Aboud, operates mainly on Northwestern Syria and has 15.000-25.000 armed force, considered as the 
driving force of Islamic Front . 
116 Militants Seize Iraq’s second city of Mosul , ( 10 June 2014) http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27778112 BBC 
News Retrieved 05-20-2015 
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4.2. Independent Variables: Jihadist Discourse  
   
As argued in the previous chapter, the independent variables of this study is 
jihadism. Thus, in the following section the statements and releases of the parties, 
which are The Islamic State, Iraq and Syria, are focused on. 
 
4.2.1 Jihadi Discourse of The Islamic State 
 
The Islamic State pays immense amounts of attention and funds for propagation and 
in order to reach the target masses, it employs various conduits. These are either via 
video messages, audio messages and sometimes via publications, booklets and songs 
(nasheeds) and by other means. I will analyze all of these instruments in order to 
gauge a holistic result. 
4.2.1.1 Speeches of “The Caliph” 
 
First appearance of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was at Mosul’s Great Mosque, leading 
congregation prayer in the 4th of July 2014120. This date is important for two reasons: 
Firstly it is the first time ever Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was seen while actually making 
a speech before leading the prayer during the Holy Ramadhan Month in the Iraqi 
city of Mosul.Secondly, time that was chosen was especially important because it is 
actually the “independence day” of the United States of America. 
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Expectedly, 21 minutes 03 seconds long sermon’s content was about the newly 
founded state and expectations from the “ummah”. 
 
7:04-7:29 : Ramadhan is a month in which the market of Jihad (souq al Jihad) is 
prepared. Therefore, The Prophet, may peace and salutations upon him, would 
prepare brigades and armies to fight the enemies of Allah and perform Jihad against 
the polytheists (mushrikoon). So, seize the opportunity of this noble month, O slaves 
of Allah, by obeying Him. For in this month, reward is multiplied.121122 
 
He continues as following: 
 
7:49-8:13 :  Allah Tebaraka and Teala ordered us to fight His enemies and perform 
Jihad in the path of Allah ( fi sabeelillahi) to establish this oneness (tawheed)123 and 
establish the religion.” And after these words he continues his sermon by reciting 
the verse :  “And fight them until there is no fitnah and until the religion , all of it, is 
of Allah’s. And if they cease, then indeed, Allah is seeing all what they do.”124125 
9:09-9:43 :  Indeed your brothers the mujahideen were blessed with victory by Allah 
tabaraka and Ta’ala and we are blessed with consolidation after long years of jihad, 
patience and fighting the enemies of Allah. Allah guided them and strengthened 
them to establish this goal. Therefore they rushed to announce the Khilafah and 
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appoint an imam. This is an obligation upon Muslims and an obligation abandoned 
for centuries and disappeared from the face of the earth. 
  
12:17- 13:19 “If you want Allah’s promise, then perform jihad fi sabeelillah. Incite 
the believers and be patient upon this hardship. If you knew what was in jihad, a 
reward, honor, loftiness and might in this world and afterlife, none of you would sit 
back or remain behind abandoning jihad. It is the trade Allah guided to. He saved 
the people from humiliation by it. And He attached honor to it (jihad) in this world 
and afterlife. It is that you believe in Allah and His messenger, and perform jihad in 
the path of Allah with your wealth and your lives. This is the best for you, if you 
should know. He will forgive you for your sins, and admit you to a garden under 
which rivers flow, that is the great triumph.” 
Although entire speech revolves around acknowledging the importance of the 
establishing a state, the correlation between performing jihad against enemies and 
helping the state (consolidating it ) is pointed out. 
The second speech where al-Baghdadi addressed the people is called “ Although the 
Disbelievers Despise” ( Walaw Kareehal Kaferuun). It is released both as video 
and audio separately and uploaded to internet on November 13,  2014 by official 
media outlet of The Islamic State “Muassasatul Al Furqan” Media Outlet. Name of 
the video is adopted from the Qur’anic Verse Surat at- Tawbah ( Repentance) Verse 
32 that says  
“They want to extinguish the light of Allah with their mouths, but Allah refuses 
except to perfect His light, Although the disbelievers despise it” 
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Video Release is 16 minutes and 55 seconds long. The main concern of this speech 
is struggling and fighting. Some quotations are as follows: 
  00:56-01:09: Allah -‘azza w jall- has enjoined fighting upon us as He enjoined  
prayer and fasting.  For He -subhana w ta’ala said : “ Fighting has been enjoined 
upon you while it is hateful to you”126127 
01:19-01:31 : “Allah –Tabaraka w ta’ala- also made Jihad the best of deeds and the 
peak of Islam. He –subhanallah- placed the honor of the Muslims in Jihad and 
imposed humiliation upon them for abandoning it.” 
01:52:02:24  :  “Allah –(‘azza w Jall) also prepared a painful torment for those who 
stay back from Jihad. He (te’ala) said : “ If you do not go forth, He will punish you 
with a painful punishment and will replace you with another people and you will not 
harm Him at all.”128 He ordered all with jihad without making exception for anyone. 
For He (‘azza wa Jall) said “ Go forth, whether light or heavy”. 129  Allah 
(subhanallah) ordered with fighting in all conditions, even if only one mujahid were 
left.” 
As can be seen, al-Baghdadi stressed three points in first 150 seconds which are:  
1) Importance of implementing Jihad 
2) Reward and necessity of Jihad and 
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23-2015 ( Video is uploaded in Arabic Language with no subtitles) 
128 Holy Qur’an- At Tawbah-39 
129 Holy Qur’an At-Tawbah -41 
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3) Threat of abandoning jihad whether old or young & much or few. 
In the following section, al-Baghdadi creates a causal link between previous 
paragraphs and the situation in which the Islamic Nation is in, in order to encourage 
all Muslims to participate in Jihad. He continues : 
02:24:03:48  “Thus, it is upon the Muslims to understand well and realize that 
fighting is obligatory upon each individual from amongst them, and that Jihad is the 
best of the deeds and the peak of Islam.!  Their Honour and sublimity is by it, as 
their wellbeing in the world and hereafter. Their humiliation, failure and 
degradation are by abandoning it as well as their torment in the world and 
hereafter. They must also realize that Allah ( ‘azza wa Jall) will aid the mujahideen. 
This is inevitable. And thus, for his reason the soldiers of The Islamic State fight.! 
They fight in obedience to Allah and to gain closeness to Him ( subhanah wa ta’ala). 
They will never abandon fighting” 
After making a point about the necessity of performing Jihad, al-Baghdadi promotes 
The Islamic State and shows it as the primary and the only address to perform it as 
can be seen above. After this, he started to point and define the enemy. As follows :  
04:41:05:12 “And despite this Crusade ( Saleebeen)  being from the most severe 
and fiercest of them, it is yet but the most failing and disappointing. We see America 
and its allies stumbling between fear, weakness , inability and failure. America, 
Europe, Canada, Australia, their apostate 130  tails and slaves from amongst the 
                                               
 
130 Murtadd ( Apostate), comes from the arabic root “ ridda” means leaving, staying out. So, Murtad here is pointing a group of 
people who used to be considered as Muslims but after their actions, they lost thier recognition by it. 
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rulers of the Muslims’ lands were terrified by The Islamic State. The Jews were 
frightened.” 
07:48-07:58: “America and its allies are terrified, weak and powerless. Due to their 
fear and weakness, the Jews covertly and stealthily participate in this crusade.” 
09:04-09:32 “The leaders of the Jews, Crusaders, apostates, their devils, chiefs and 
seniors gathered. They thought, calculated, planned, plotted and schemed for a war 
against The Islamic State. Then they came out with a failing plan manifested by 
bombarding the positions, battalions, vehicles and soldiers of The Islamic State with 
the purpose of preventing its advance and march.” 
al-Baghdadi, after defining the enemies and their collaborators both among Muslims 
and non-Muslim communities, proceeds to talking about the situation in the field 
which he describes as “ a certain defeat for them”. And continues to talk about “glad 
tidings” 
10:35-10:48 : “And indeed the Muslims  will be victorious. By Allah’s promise, they 
will be victorious. And the march of the mujahideen will continue until they reach to 
Rome, by Allah’s permission. Therefore, be assured, O Muslims, and glad tidings.!” 
After mentioning the futility of anti-IS campaign, al-Baghdadi calls all Muslims on 
the Earth for armed struggle as  follows :  
11:17-16:55 “( Some parts are cut ) Glad tidings O Muslims, for we give you good 
news by announcing the expansion of The Islamic State to new lands. To lands of Al-
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Haramain131 and Yemen. to Egypt, Libya and Algeria. We announce the acceptance 
of the bay’ah132 in those lands. 
So O sons of Al-Haramayn, O people of tawheed, O people of walâ and Barâ.133 The 
serpent’s head and the stronghold of the disease are beside you! Thus, draw your 
swords and break their sheaths. Divorce the Dunya , for there will be no security 
nor rest for Âl Salûl (Crusaders) and their soldiers after today.Draw your swords 
deal with the rafidha134 first, wherever you find them! Deal with the rafidha, al –
Salul and their soldiers…. be patient, do not hasten. Soon, godwilling, the 
vanguards of The Islamic State will reach you! (addressing to the Yemeni People:) 
Be harsh against the Houthi135 rafidah for they are kuffar apostates. Fight them and 
overcome them. Be certain that their turn is coming and it will be in your favor for 
the rafidah are a forsaken nation” 
As can be explicitly seen, this recording aims to define Jihad, and its religious 
framework  and  to clarify the goals and enemies. The most crucial points about this 
recording is that al-Baghdadi openly and clearly classifies the enemies under 4 
categories as follows : 
1) United States, European States and their allies 
2) Jewish community and the State of Israel 
                                               
 
131 Holy cities of Mecca and Madinah 
132 religious pledge of allegience 
133 religious terms that imply “ to love for Allah what He loves and to hate for Allah what he Hates. 
134 “Rafidha” in dictionary means “ the ones who reject” but in terminology it is the other name of Shi’a. Also can be used as “ 
Rafidhiyya” 
135 named after the Houthi tribe, a Imamiyya Shi’a currently fighting against Zaydi Shia and Sunni’s. 
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3) Secular regimes controlling Muslim soil and population 
4) Shi’a  
And secondly it calls all Muslims for armed struggle of which reward is immense 
and torment it is as immense respectively for those who participate and those who 
don’t. Thus, this speech constitutes a monumental milestone for the “jihadi 
discourse” made by a top rank of The Islamic State authority.  
Another speech delivered by al-Baghdadi is named “ March Forth, whether light or 
heavy!”   Name of recording is derived from a Qur’anic verse mentioned in Sura At-
Tawbah as follows:  “March Forth whether light or heavy and perform Jihad in the 
path of Allah with your wealth and lives and this is better for you if only you know 
so.” Audio recording lasts 34 minutes and 47 seconds long.  It is uploaded to 
internet on the 14th of May, 2015 in Arabic language. 
04:42-05:04 : “O Muslim! O you who claims to love Allah (the Mighty and 
Majestic), and claims to love His Prophet (peace be upon him) If you are truthful in 
your claim, then obey your beloved and fight for the cause of Allah, and emulate 
your beloved (peace be upon him), and do not die except as a mujāhid for the cause 
of Allah.”136 
06:44-07:12 : “ Indeed, your Lord has made jihād for the cause of Allah obligatory 
upon you and has commanded you to fight His enemies so that He may forgive your 
sins, raise you in rank, take from among you martyrs, purify the believers, and 
destroy the disbelievers. Otherwise, He Himself (the Glorified) is capable of 
prevailing over them. But it is in order to test you”. 
                                               
 
136 Audio	is	released	anonymously	on	“http://justpaste.it/Infiro	“	web	adress	on	14th	of	May	2015. 
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07:45-08:05 “O Muslims! Whoever thinks that it is within his capacity to conciliate 
with the Jews, Christians, and other disbelievers, and for them to conciliate with 
him, such that he coexists with them and they coexist with him while he is upon his 
religion and upon tawhīd, then he has belied the explicit statement of his Lord.” 
 
09:43-10:22 :  “O Muslims! Do not think the war that we are waging is The Islamic 
State’s war alone. Rather, it is the Muslims’ war altogether. It is the war of every 
Muslim in every place, and The Islamic State is merely the spearhead in this war. It 
is but the war of the people of faith against the people of disbelief, so march forth to 
your war O Muslims. March forth everywhere, for it is an obligation upon every 
Muslim who is accountable before Allah. And whoever stays behind or flees, Allah 
(the Mighty and Majestic) will be angry with him and will punish him with a painful 
torment.” 
11:07 -11:31 “So there is no excuse for any Muslim who is capable of performing 
Hijrah to The Islamic State, or capable of carrying a weapon where he is, for Allah 
(the Blessed and Exalted) has commanded him with hijrah137 and Jihād, and has 
made fighting obligatory upon him. And we call upon every Muslim in every place to 
perform hijrah to The Islamic State or fight in his land wherever that may be.” 
16:48 :17:40 “O Muslims, the apostate tyrannical rulers who rule your lands in the 
lands of the Two Holy Sanctuaries (Mecca and Medina), Yemen, Shām (the Levant), 
Iraq, Egypt, North Africa, Khorasan, the Caucasus, the Indian Subcontinent, Africa, 
and elsewhere, are the allies of the Jews and Crusaders. Rather, they are their 
                                               
 
137 Migration to a place where Islamic rule is applied or going to a place in otder to participate in Islamic affairs ranging from 
education to military service. 
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slaves, servants, and guard dogs, and nothing else. The armies that they prepare and 
arm and which the Jews and Crusaders train are only to crush you, weaken you, 
enslave you to the Jews and Crusaders, turn you away from your religion and the 
path of Allah, plunder the goods of your lands, and rob you of your wealth. This 
reality has become as obvious as the sun in the middle of the day.” 
As can be apparently seen, authorities of mentioned lands are named as dogs and 
slaves of Jews and Christians and they should be toppled. This is an explicit call for 
armed struggle against these authorities. 
21:56-22:42- “O Muslims everywhere, has the time not come for you to realize the 
truth of the conflict and that it is between disbelief and faith? See on which front the 
rulers of your lands stand and to which camp they belong. Has the time not come O 
Ahlus-Sunnah for you to know that you alone are the targets? This war is only 
against you and against your religion. Has the time not come for you to return to 
your religion and your jihād and thereby bring back your glory, honor, rights, and 
leadership? Has the time not come for you to know that there is no might nor honor 
nor safety nor rights for you except in the shade of the Caliphate?” 
 
24:46-24:58   “So seek shelter – after Allah – with The Islamic State. What do you 
wait for after the truth has become clearer than the day and after the spiteful 
Rāfidah exposed their reality?” 
The final paragraph above is indeed a brief summary of the entire speech. al-
Baghdadi is defining the Saudi Kingdom, USA and coalition, Iran, Israel and its 
parent states (Syria and Iraq) as enemies. His ever-repeating stress is on Shi’a (he 
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uses a more special name “ Rafidha” or “ Rafidhiyya”) and calls for hijrah and 
performing jihad. 
Another message from al-Baghdadi is named “A message to the Mujahideen and to 
the Islamic Ummah in the month of Ramadan.” Release is uploaded to Internet by 
al-Furqan Media Outlet on 1st of July, 2014138 and lasts 19 minutes 53 seconds. He 
continues to repeat his messages on calling for armed struggle and performing jihad. 
03:46- 04:16 “And there is no deed in this virtuous month or in any other month 
better than jihad in the path of Allah,so take advantage of this opportunity and walk 
the path of you righteous predecessors. Support the religion of Allah through jihad 
in the path of Allah. Go forth, O mujahidin in the path of Allah. Terrify the enemies 
of Allah and seek death in the places where you expect to find it, for the dunyā 
(worldly life) will come to an end, and the hereafter will last forever.”139 
06:42- 06:46 “So take up arms, take up arms, O soldiers of The Islamic State! And 
fight, fight!” 
09:37-09:45 “So listen, O ummah of Islam. Listen and comprehend. Stand up and 
rise. For the time has come for you to free yourself from the shackles of weakness, 
and stand in the face of tyranny, against the treacherous rulers – the agents of the 
crusaders and the atheists, and the guards of the Jews” 
 
                                               
 
138  Anjarini Suhaib,  (July 2 2014) “ Al Baghdadi following in bin Laden’s footsteps.” http://english.al-
akhbar.com/node/20400” Retrieved 05-23-2015 
139	ﺔﺴﺳ ﺆ ﻣ نﺎ ﻗ ﺮﻔ ﻟا  : Al-Furqaan Media, (01.07.2014) “A Message to the Mujahideen and the Muslim Ummah – Al Sheikh al 
Baghdaadi” https://archive.org/details/bghdd_20140701 Retrieved 05-23-2015  
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15:08- 15:20 “Therefore, rush O Muslims to your state. Yes, it is your state. Rush, 
because Syria is not for the Syrians, and Iraq is not for the Iraqis. The earth is 
Allah’s.” 
 
15:32-15:43 “O Muslims everywhere, whoever is capable of performing hijrah 
(emigration) to The Islamic State, then let him do so, because hijrah to the land of 
Islam is obligatory.” 
As can be seen clearly, al-Baghdadi is building his speeches on major themes 
which are identical or very similar to each other in speeches. He stresses that there is 
a legitimate The Islamic State and western states, Gulf states and other regimes in 
the region as well as local forces as enemies which should be destroyed. Muslims 
have a country and they are obliged to make hijrah there and participate in the act of 
jihad. The Shi’a is the primary enemy and Iraqi and Syrian forces are as well. Not so 
obvious in the former speeches but it is obvious in later ones that al-Baghdadi starts 
to make mention of how well institutionalized the newly-founded state and self-
sufficient it is to be victorious. Speeches actually designed in with a recurring 
pattern and that pattern has indispensible parts. These parts can be said to have 
become meta narratives for the group and are the evidence The Islamic State is built 
on prophetic way and equipped with prophetic goals, it is persistent on soil and 
Muslims are obliged to support it with their belongings and their lives. They must 
also participate in Jihad alongside The Islamic State against the designated enemy 
Shi’a, Nusayri Regime, Crusaders (USA and coalition), and apostate regimes. Thus, 
it tries to be a focus and command center for all those jihadist group outside. This 
ambition and discourse causes two great challenges for the IS. First one is that it 
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creates a challenge against other jihadi factions like Al-Qai’dah , Taleban, Ahrar-
ush Sham and so on. Harith Hasan al-Qarawee says in his study that The Islamic 
State’s messages vary according to who is uttering them. For major topics, key 
leaders are in charge and for daily issues and miscellaneous topics, it is the duty of 
lower rank leaders to make comment on them or they are mentioned in booklets 
etc.140 Next section will be about the well-known publication: Dabiq. 
 
4.2.1.3. “Dabiq” : A publication As a Secondary Source for Invitation to Jihad 
 
Propaganda by printed publication is not a novelty among jihadi groups at all. Since 
the Iraqi War, such groups have been disseminating their ideas and calling 
youngsters for armed struggle. Furthermore they have been giving hints and tips for 
home-made ammunition and weaponry. Al-Fursa,n, Sada al Rafidayn, Inspire, Al-
Malahem, Ihya e Khilafat, Resurgence, Palestine, Benefit of The Day, Azan and 
many more could be given as examples. Although al-Qa’idaism has adopted such 
manner in the field, The Islamic State has made it even more complicated and 
maybe more successful under the name of Dabiq. Name of the magazine is 
purposefully selected. It has a history and a prophetic narration as follows. : “Abu 
Huraira reported Allah's Messenger (may peace be upon him) as saying: The Last 
Hour would not come until the Romans would be defeated at a land at al-A'maq or 
                                               
 
140 Harith Hasan al-Qarawee., The Discourse of ISIS: Messages, Propaganda and Indroctrination” Twitter and Jihad : The 
Communication Strategy of ISIS, Monica Maggioni & Paolo Magri(ed.) ISPI Press , Milano , 2015,  
p147 
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in Dabiq….”141  And this name is made mentioned by Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi 
previously and by Jihadi John when announcing the beheading of Peter Kassig  as 
the following : 
        “The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heart will continue 
intensify- by Allah’s permission-until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq. We are 
burying first American crusader here, in Dabiq and eagerly waiting for the rest of 
your armies.”142143 
Dabiq’s first issue is released only one month after the invasion of Mosul, precisely 
on 5th of July 2014 144and up until now ( July 2015) 10 issues have been printed and 
released. It should be born in mind that unlike the speeches made by key leaders, 
articles Dabiq Magazine are less direct and propagate jihadism in indirect ways/ It 
shouldalso be noted that this study did not cite from each issue but rather created a 
dataset of 4 random issues. 
4.2.1.3.1 Issue 1: The Return of Khilafah 
 
"On the Page 10 , under the title of “ The world had divided into two camps” : “ 
Amirul Mu’minin 145 said :  
                                               
 
141 Sahih Muslim, “Kitab Al Fitan wa Ashrat As Sa’ah.” Hadith no : 6924 
142  Cyphre, Louis , ( January 13, 2015) , “ Onthoofding van Peter Kassig Abdul Rahman 16 November 2014” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dn8nwPRVf5g”  YouTube Retrieved 05-25-2015 
143 As can be seen, this commentary consists of 2 sentences. It must be pointed that first sentence is completely belong to al-
Zarqawi when he was performing his beheading in Iraq. 
144 Monica Maggioni. “ The Islamic State: Not That Surprising If You Know Where to Look” Twitter and Jihad : The 
Communication Strategy of ISIS, Monica Maggioni & Paolo Magri(ed.) ISPI Press , Milano , 2015, p 72 
 
145 En: Leader of the Muslims. Firstly adopted by Umar bin Khattab when he took Office of leadership and it became a 
synonim of “ Kaliph” after him. 
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“ O Ummah of Islam, indeed the world today has been divided into two camps and 
two trenches, with who third camp present: The camp of the Muslims and the camp 
of kufr (disbelief) and hypocricy.- the camp of the Muslims and the mujahidin 
everywhere and the camp of the jews, the  crusaders, their allies and with them the 
rest of the nations and religious of kufr, all being led by America and Russia and 
being mobilized by the Jews.” 
On the same page under the title of “ A Call to Hijah” : “ Amirul Mu’minin said : 
Therefore, rush O Muslims to your state. Yes, it is your state. Rush, because Syria is 
not for the Syrians and the Iraq is not for Iraqis. The State is for all Muslim, all the 
Muslims. O Muslims Everywhere, whoever is capable of performing hijrah to The 
Islamic State then let him do so because hijrah to the land of Islam is obligatory”. 
On the same page under the title of “ A Call to All Muslim Doctors, Engineers, 
Scholars and Specialists” : Amirul-Mu’minin said:  
                 “We make a special call to the scholars, fuqaha’ (experts in Islamic 
jurisprudence), and callers, especially the judges, as well as people with military, 
administrative, and service expertise, and medical doctors and engineers of all 
different specializations and fields. We call them and remind them to fear Allah, for 
their emigration is wajib ‘ayni (an individual obligation), so that they can answer 
the dire need of the Muslims for them. People are ignorant of their religion and they 
thirst for those who can teach them and help them understand it. So fear Allah, O 
slaves of Allah.” 
 
On the page 27 under the title of “ The Islamic State Is A True Imamah”146 “ And 
upon them (  Islamic scholars) is to understand that The Islamic State -on account of 
what Allah has blessed it with victory, consolidation and establishing the religion-is 
regarded as an unquestionable imamah. As such, anyone who rebels against its 
                                               
 
146 Imam, in Arabic language means “ leader” but in such context used in the magazine, it is political, religious and military 
leaedership combined in one person or one entity. 
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authority inside its territory is considered a renegade, and it is permissible to fight 
him after establishing the hujjah147 against him.” 
4.2.1.3.2 Issue 2 : The Flood 
 
On the Page 3 under the “Foreword” it is written  
          “ First priority is to perform hijrah from wherever you are to The 
Islamic State, from dârul-kufr to dârul-islâm. Secondly, if you cannot perform hijrah 
for whatever extraordinary reason, then try in your location to organize bay’āt 
(pledges of allegiance) to the Khalīfah Ibrāhīm. 148  Publicize them as much as 
possible. Gather people in the masājid, Islamic centers, and Islamic organizations, 
for example, and make public announcements of bay’ah. Try to record these bay’āt 
and then distribute them through all forms of media including the Internet. It is 
necessary that bay’ah becomes so common to the average Muslim that he considers 
those holding back as grossly abnormal. This effort, inshā’allah, will encourage 
Islamic groups to abandon their partisanship and also announce their bay’ah to the 
Khalīfah Ibrāhīm.” 
 
On the pages 18-19 under the title of “ Hijrah and Jihad” it is written that  
           “Allah’s Messenger ( Sallallahu alayhi wa sallam) said , “ Hijrah 
will not cease as long as there is jihad”  Allah’s Messenger ( Sallallahu alayhi wa 
sallam) said, “ Shaytan sat in wait for the son of Âdam upon the roads. He sat in 
wait for him on the path of Islam and said “Will you accept Islam, leave your 
religion and the religion of your forefathers! So he disobeyed him and accepted 
Islam. Then he sat in wait for him upon the path of hijrah and said, ‘Will you 
emigrate and abandon your land and your sky? The muhājir is like a horse fastened 
by a rope to a peg!’ So he disobeyed him and emigrated. Then he sat in wait for him 
upon the path of jihād and said, ‘Its exhaustion of oneself and one’s wealth; you’ll 
fight and be killed. Your wife will be married [after you],and your wealth will be 
divided.’ So he disobeyed him and performed jihād. Whoever does this of them and 
then dies or is killed or drowns or is stomped upon to death by his riding animal, it 
is then incumbent upon Allah to enter him into Jannah”. 
                                               
 
147 Clarifying his error to him with religious evidences. 
148 Referring to al-Baghdadi 
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4.2.1.3.3. Issue 3 : A Call to Hijrah 
 
On the page 26 under the title of “ Introduction: Hijrah from Hypocrisy to Sincerity” 
it is written that   
“Therefore, every Muslim professional who delayed his jihad in the past 
under the pretense of studying Shari’ah, medicine, or engineering etc., claiming he 
would contribute to Islam later with his expertise, should now make is number one 
priority to repent and answer the call to hijrah especially after the establishment of 
the Khilafah. This Khilafah is more in need than ever before for experts, 
professionals and specialists who can help contribute in strengthening its structure 
and tending to the need of their Muslim brothers. Otherwise, his claims will become 
a greater proof against him on Judgment Day. As for the Muslim students who use 
this same pretense now to continue abandoning the obligation of the era, then they 
should know that their hijrah from darul kufr to darul Islam is more obligatory and 
urgent then ( than) spending an unknown number years studying while exposed to 
doubts and desires that will destroy their religion and thus end for themselves any 
possible future of jihad.” 
 
On the page 27, under the title  “ Part 2: The Fear of Hypocricy” it is written that : 
         
         
 
        “So abandoning hijrah – the path to jihād – is a dangerous matter. In 
effect, one is thereby deserting jihād and willingly accepting his tragic condition of 
being a hypocritical spectator. He lives in the West amongst the kuffār for years, 
spends hours on the Internet, reads news and posts on forums, only to be 
encompassed by the verse, {They think the parties have not [yet] withdrawn. And if 
the parties should come [again], they would wish they were in the desert among the 
Bedouins, inquiring [from afar] about your news. And if they should be among you, 
they would not fight except for a little} [Al-Ahzāb: 20]. On should ask himself, 
“What is the assurance that I’m not encompassed by this verse or others like it?” 
“Ask yourself, “What is the assurance that Allah did not dislike my being 
dispatched? Maybe He saw in me a trait of hypocrisy which I cannot see, and 
therefore He banned me from jihād?” This constant feeling of self-doubt should 
destroy one’s insides. In the recent past, sincere Muslims would weep and pray daily 
for an escape from the lands of qu’ūd (abandonment of jihād) to the lands of jihād, 
even if to live only as a soldier in constant wait for the opportunity to battle. They 
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would dream of going to Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Chechnya, Algeria, Somalia, 
and Waziristan, but to no avail. They knew that the only way for a man claiming a 
mustard seed of faith in his heart to preserve his faith wouldbe to leave the West. 
Before, such an idea might have sounded impossible for some, but now there is a 
Khilāfah prepared to accept every Muslim and Muslimah into its lands and do all it 
can within its power to protect them while relying on Allah alone.” 
 
On the page 31 under the name of “There Is No Life Without Jihad” “Jihad not only 
grants life on the larger scale of the Ummah, it also grants a fuller life on the scale of 
the individual. This life of Jihad is not possible until you pack and move to the 
Khilafah.” 
On the page 37 under the title of “ Advice for Those Embarking Upon Hijrah” it is 
written that  
            “ So do not say to yourself “ I will never succeed in my hijrah” Most of 
those who have tried, have successfully reached the Khilafah. Amongst them are 
those who travelled by land, sometimes on foot, from country to country, crossing 
border after border and Allah brought them safely to the Khilafah. Do not worry 
about money or accommodation for yourself and your family. There are plenty of 
homes and resources to cover you and your family” 
 
4.2.1.3.4. Issue 4 : The Failed Crusade 
 
On the page 10 under the title “My Provision Was Placed For Me In the Shade Of 
My Spear” it is written that 
          “This hadīth indicates that Allah did not send His messenger to endeavor to 
seek the dunyā, nor to gather the dunyā and its treasures, nor to strive to seek its 
causes, rather He sent him as a caller to His tawhīd with the sword. What is implied 
by this is that he kills Allah’s enemies who refuse to accept tawhīd, legitimizes the 
spilling of their blood and the taking of their wealth, and enslaves their women and 
children, and thereby his provision becomes what Allah has given him of spoils from 
the property of His enemy. This is because wealth was created by Allah for the 
children of Adam only to assist them in obeying and worshipping Him. So whoever 
uses it to assist himself in kufr of Allah and shirk with Him, then Allah will give 
mastery to His Messenger and his followers over him, so that they seize it from him 
and return it back to one who is more worthy than him from the people who worship 
Allah, practice tawhīd of Him, and submit obediently towards Him. For this reason 
their wealth is called fay’ [the root of the word means to restore or return], because 
it returns to one who is more deserving of it and it returns to the usage for which it 
was created.” 
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On the page 44 under the title of “ Rush to Support Your State O Muslim” it is 
written that “  Every Muslim should get out of his house, find a crusader, and kill 
him. It is important that the killing becomes attributed to patrons of The Islamic 
State who have obeyed its leadership. This can easily be done with anonymity. 
Otherwise, crusader media makes such attacks appear to be random killings. 
Secrecy should be followed when planning and executing any attack. The smaller the 
numbers of those involved and the less the discussion beforehand, the more likely it 
will be carried out without problems. One should not complicate the attacks by 
involving other parties, purchasing complex materials, or communicating with 
weak-hearted individuals. “Rely upon Allah and stab the crusader” should be the 
battle cry for all The Islamic State patrons. Finally, do not forget that Allah is with 
the Muslims and will never abandon them to His enemies. And The Islamic State will 
remain until its banner flies over Rome.” 
 
Dabiq Magazine has ten issues so far. In addition to the aforementioned issues, there 
are also “Remaining and Expanding” , “ Al Qai’dah of Waziristan : A Testimony 
From Within”, “ From Hypocricy to Apostast : The Extinction of the Greyzone”, “ 
Shari’ah Alone will Rule Africa” “   “ They Plot and Allah Plots”  and “The Law of 
Allah or the Laws of Men” issues. It should be noted that The Islamic State has 
several more magazines like ISR and ISN in English, Tevhid and Konstantiniyye in 
Turkish and moreover it has video releases too. 
4.2.1.4 HD Video Releases 
 
The Islamic State did something not any other Jihadi organization has done before, 
which is professionally shot video-movies and documentary series. Some of which 
are about beheadings and exerting penalties whereas some others are to show force 
and propagate the current situation in the territories under the control of The Islamic 
State. Repeating the theme in the speeches, sermons and magazines could be easily 
found in video releases filmed and uploaded by al-Hayat Media Outlet, main media 
source of The Islamic State. Thus, the final instrument of The Islamic State is to 
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make propaganda through videos uploaded to Internet,diffused by the help of the 
social media. 
Although The Islamic State has numerous uploads, the most popular ones are 
examined. First video is “Flames of War”. The quotations below indicate how The 
Islamic State underscores its jihadist attitude. 
00:14-00:48 “In the face of the dark wave of the crusader force. The historical land 
of two rivers bore life to a mission that would transform the political landscape of 
the world.  
A mission that would herald the return to the khilafah and revive the creed of 
tawheed. It was the establishment of The Islamic State nourished by the blood of the 
truthful mujahedeen to unite the ummah on one calling, one banner, one leader.” 
02:23-02:33 “ As the ravenous flame continued spreading, roaring in the fuel of 
nusayri blood. The flames in Iraq, meanwhile continued their crawl, growing 
stronger, leaving the Americans in bewilderment.” 
31:11-32:16 “Allah continued to humiliate the enemies of The Islamic State, 
especially in Iraq where the deviant Safawi forces and their high-tech U.S. 
weaponry were up against the mujahidin.  
The brothers were relentless in their attack as the flames of war took their toll on the 
Safawi forces” 
54:37-55:07“ al-Baghdadi : Finally, this is a message that we direct to America. 
Know, O defender of the cross, that a proxy war won’t help you in Sham just as it 
didn’t help you in Iraq. As for the near future, you will be forced into a direct 
confrontation, with Allah’s permission, despite your reluctance. And the sons of 
Islam have prepared themselves for this day, so wait and see, for we too are also 
going to wait and see.” 
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There is also a video series called “Saleel As Sawarim”149 produced as a propaganda 
series . This series was shockingly successful for The Islamic State as it caught  the 
attention of the masses. On march 17, 2014150 when the fourth and final version of 
this series was uploaded to the internet, it reached the peak in terms of tweets, watch 
count and mentions online. Video series are basically about the IS attacks launched 
on Iraqi ground forces or assassinations of local political leaders. Launch on al-
Anbar, Fallujah can be seen here. The IS forces deployed and employed HD drones 
to shoot film and gave detailed information about martyrdom attacks reported by 
these vehicles. And it also has a section for “inviting people to repentance” 
It can be seen from the statistics that the Islamic State’s graphic of twitter-based 
propaganda campaign is more than successful. Reaching to approximately 2000 
tweets per hour after each video release 151  Islamic State’s campaign is also 
dominating top tiers of the trending lists of Twitter. The most frequently used 
hashtag is “Saleel as sawarim- rabi” ( rabi’ meaning “four”),  second one is “ The 
Islamic State in Iraq and Levant” , and third one is “ The Islamic State”152 
In the final analysis, The Islamic State has launched an aggressive war against its 
enemies by using the means of popular culture and media. It is safe to posit that The 
Islamic State maintains this war by three channels, which are speeches delivered by 
key leaders, video releases in numerous genres and magazines in several languages. 
All of  these instruments are analyzed in this chapter. Thus, it can be argued that The 
Islamic State explicitly describes and categorizes its enemy. These categories are 
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150 Prucha, Nico, ( 19th May 2014) “ Is This the Most Successful Release of a Jihadis Video Ever?” http://www.jihadica.com/is-
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repeatedly mentioned by such sources. Of those, parent states –Iraq and Syria- are 
defined not only as enemies in the field but also their ideologies and their creed 
(Shi’a, Rafidhiyya and Nusayri) are regarded as a target. These names and enemy 
description have been indicated without leaving any doubt about it. Therefore, it 
would not be wrong to argue that The Islamic State aims to gain upper hand against 
its enemies in terms of jihadist discourse.  
In the next section, the discourses of the parent states, Iraq and Syria regarding 
jihadism is examined in order to make a comparative analysis. 
4.2.2. Jihadi Discourse of Parent States 
 
As mentioned previously, discourses of the ruling elite in The Islamic State’s parent 
states is also analyzed. Because the time span of this thesis is between the years 
2013-2015, I will focus on this time period. Although there are many speeches by 
low rank authorities or semi-official institutions, I will only reflect official 
statements of the ruling elite.  
4.2.2.1. The Republic of Iraq 
 
President of the Republic of Iraq, Fuad Masum” on April 23rd, 2015 , had a speech 
in Turkey under the title of “ President of the Republic calls of the people and the 
nations of the world to stop one man to eliminate the curse of terrorism” He said “ 
The curse of our times in which we live is that extremism and terrorism which 
violence is currently being practiced in the name of religion and sectarianism. The 
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worst example of this group is Da’esh 153  (IS) who reached their hatred and 
obscurantism even to the effects of our cherished population and our people and 
besides peoples of the all world, humanitarian values and human dignity and the 
right to live and right to believe.” 154 
He also continued in the same meeting “We stand for solidarity and unified position 
against this terrible calamity, which cannot be repelled if we neglect to consider 
joint action and responsibility.”155 
President Masum, on 6th of August 2014 made a similar speech when he met 
Undersecretary of Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Baghdad. He said “In 
another aspect of the meeting, I warn you about serious terrorist plots organized by 
Da’esh in the region adding that the fight against this organization requires effort in 
which everyone co-operates to stop extension of this obscurantist thought.”156 
President of Iraq uttered similar words in his well-known interview with Michael 
Gordon, National Security Correspondent of New York Times, in 26th of September 
2014. Masum said  “How did this terrorist organization come about? When we go 
back in history, we find that there were many similar organizations practicing 
terrorism, while the group of (inaudible) in the past, they were—they used to drug 
the youth, brainwash them, and make death as something that they should wish for 
through giving them baseless dreams. So they used to carry out suicide attacks. 
                                               
 
153 AdDawlat al Islamiyya fil ‘Iraqi wa ash Sham ( capital letters of the name of the group makes Da’esh) 
154    ﺲﯿ ﺋ ر  ﺔﯾ رﻮﮭﻤﺠﻟ ا  ﻮ ﻋﺪ ﯾ  بﻮﻌﺷ  لودو  ﻢﻟ ﺎ ﻌﻟ ا  ﻰﻟ إ  ﺔﻔ ﻗ و ﻞﺟر ﺪﺣا و لءﺎ ﻀ ﻘﻟ  ﻰﻠ ﻋ  ﺔﻓ آ  بﺎ ھرﻹا , ,(April 23, 2015)   “ 
http://presidency.iq/ﺲﯿ ﺋ ر -ﺔﯾ رﻮﮭﻤﺠﻟ ا-ﻮ ﻋﺪ ﯾ -بﻮﻌﺷ -لودو-ﻢﻟ ﺎ ﻌﻟ ا -إ/” Retrieved 2015-05-27 
155 Ibid. 
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Many times, a lot of these terrorist practices were in the name of religion or in the 
name of sect. And there was mixed—and terrorist acts were mixed between religious 
sectarian and political.”157 
He also said the following words during the same interview “At the beginning, some 
simple people thought that these people will be a win for the Sunnis, but then when 
they saw them, they attacked the Sunnis, they realized that they are not with the 
Sunnis for this. ISIS does not represent the Sunnis, does not represent the Shia, does 
not represent anybody. It is an evil plant that was—that grew in this area. And as I 
said, they believe in one religion, just their religion, and they are not bound to a 
certain boundary, and its not only Iraq and Levant. If they can, they will control the 
whole world.”158 
Indeed, the words above are very crucial to understand two opposite mentalities 
dealing with the very same incident happening in the field. A comparison between 
the paragraph above and any speech belonging to The Islamic State elite is sufficient 
to constitute a scale from 0 to1 in terms of jihadi discourse.  
Masum continues: “And also, for the religious awareness and education, the 
clergymen, people of religion should concentrate on saying that Islam or 
highlighting that Islam is not the religion of killing people and terrorism, especially 
in today's world. For example, today, there are no slaves. Today, in this world, in 
this day and age, we should not have anything called slaves and be a free people. 
The international campaign is an excellent start, and we hope that this campaign 
will yield positive results in getting rid of ISIS. 
                                               
 
157“Iraqi President Fuad Masum on ISIS and Iraq’s Challeges”, 26 September 2014, http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraqi-president-
fuad-masum-isis-iraqs-challenges/p35742 Council on Foreign Relations retrieved 2015-05-27 
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Many times, a lot of these terrorist practices was in the name of religion or in the 
name of sect. And there was mixed—and terrorist acts were mixed between religious 
sectarian and political. ”159 
President Masum ,  in his meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany 
on August 16,  2014, noted that “Iraq is facing a new kind of violence against Iraqis 
in general, terrorism and against members of religious minorities, Kaloesidean, 
Christians and others, in the areas controlled by the criminal organization. There is 
a need for concerted efforts of the international community with Iraq in order to put 
an end to this expansion terrorist and end being a great danger not only to Iraq, but 
by the whole region and the world.”160 
President Masum made a speech about the victory of the Iraqi Army alongside 
Persmerga and Sunni tribesmen against The Islamic State forces in Iraqi city Tikrit 
on 31st of March 2015 and said “ …… praising the resistance of our people with all 
its components to stop one man to cancel democratic system and praising for 
cleansing all cities and territory from terrorist elements.”161 
Ibrahim al-Jaafari, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq, has made similar speeches 
numerous times. One of them was on December 8, 2014 in IISS Manama Dialogue 
2014 : 10th Regional Security Summit. In his speech Jaafari contended that :  “With 
this diverse treasury and this Iraq, which is so great in terms of its past, its present 
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and its civilization, it is today dealing with a shameful violation by forces of evil who 
have taken for themselves the name ‘Daesh’162 
He marked his most important words for this thesis as follows : “I would like to tell 
you something. Whoever imagines that Daesh represents Islam is mistaken. Even 
they are committing an offence, a sin. It has no relationship with religion. I said in 
2004 that Daesh has no religion, no faith and no nation. It was as though I was 
reading the future, that the Christian communities would be penetrated by Daesh 
organisations. Their Christian religion would be held against them and the 
Christian religion is innocent. It will also perhaps spread if the world remains silent 
about what is happening now in Iraq, Syria and the region. It will also spread to the 
Hindu, Confucian and Buddhist communities, all of which are innocent. Daesh has 
no religion; it is not bound by religion or values. We should not associate the name 
of Daesh with Islam. 
Islam is a religion of peace, love and forgiveness, its name is ‘peace’ (as-salam). 
When a Muslim prays, he ends with ‘peace and Allah’s mercy and blessings be upon 
you’ (as-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatu). When you see someone you 
greet them with peace. Islam is a religion of peace. Anyone who associates 
themselves with Islam must shape themselves in the morals of Islam. It has no 
relationship to religion.”163 
                                               
 
162  Iraq, Syria and Regional Security : Ibrahim Al Jaafari , (08 December 2014,) 
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Heider al-Abadi, Iraqi Prime Minister, spoke to Der Spiegel after the liberation of 
Tikrit on 3rd of April 2015 and in his interview, he employed an anti-jihadi discourse 
as follows: “ The liberation of Tikrit is very encouraging. However, Daesh (the Arab 
acronym for The Islamic State) remains a major threat -- not only for Iraq, but also 
for the whole world. They keep on recruiting people, they have huge financial 
resources and, honestly, a uniformed army alone cannot face it on its own”164 
On September 24, 2014, Prime Minister of Iraq delivered a speech an United 
Nations Security Council Meeting regarding the issues going on in the Iraqi 
territories. In his speech he noted : “Iraq stands today in the vanguard of the fight 
against terrorism and against The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which 
has attacked my country and displaced thousands of our citizens in Mosul, in the 
north, occupied our territory, killed hundreds of Iraqi citizens on sectarian grounds 
in Tal Afar and other places, and targeted religious minorities including the Shabak, 
Yazidis, Christians and others. Those areas have suffered from sectarian and 
religious cleansing that has changed their demographics and destroyed their 
cultural and religious heritage.”165 
On May 25th, 2015 Iraqi Minister of Interior Affairs Muhammad al Ghabban had an 
interview with Sophia Shevardnadze on Iraqi politics and The Islamic State. He 
openly uttered the following supporting the other key leaders of Iraq : “First of all, 
ISIS has nothing to do with Islam, really. Frankly speaking, of course they put Islam 
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as an idea that they are related to Islam, they announced the caliphate of Islam, but 
their acts are against all Muslims. They killed everybody from Islam sects.”166 
 
4.2.2.2.Jihadi Discourses from Arab Republic Of Syria 
 
On April 20, 2015 President Bashar al-Assad of Syria said the following words 
during an interview with France 2 TV “ They send weapons to the same terrorists 
under the title of moderate opposition when Obama said its elusive, so the 
armaments will actually go to whom? To the terrorists. So this is contradiction. It 
does not work.”167 
President Al-Assad , during his interview with  Expressen Newspaper on 17th April 
2015, blamed jihadi groups for being terrorists and proxies of Wahhabism,168 and  
blamed jihadism for being the primary source of terrorism. He said “'The Wahhabi 
ideology, which forms the foundation for every kind of terrorism in the world. No 
terrorist acts for the last decades in the Middle East and in the world happened 
without this ideology. Every terrorist bases his doctrine on the Wahhabi 
ideology.''169 
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167President al-Assad : The Biggest Victory Today is to Eliminate Terrorism, Terrorists and Terrorist Thinking” ( 06 October 
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With his interview with the RTP, a Portuguese channel, in 4th of March 2015 
President Al-Assad employed a challenging discourse to Jihadists and said “The 
Syrians are determined to continue fighting terrorism, defending their country and 
defying hegemony.”170 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Syria, Walid al Moallem, explicitly portrayed the 
opinion of him and the Syrian Government in Geneva Talks held in January 2014 by 
uttering the following words: “Ladies and Gentlemen, how is what has happened 
and continues to plague Syria, meeting these aspirations? How can a Chechen, 
Afghani, Saudi, Turkish or even French and English terrorist deliver on the 
aspirations of the Syrian people, and with what? And The Islamic State that knows 
nothing of Islam except perverse Wahhabism? Who declared anyway that the Syrian 
people aspire to live thousands of years in the past?”171 He continued “In the name 
of the revolution, children are killed in their schools and students in their 
universities, women are extorted in the name of jihad al-nikah and other forms, 
mosques are shelled whilst worshipers kneel at prayer, heads are severed and hung 
in the streets, people are burned alive in a true holocaust that history and many 
countries will deny without being accused of anti-Semitism.”172 
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is repeating his anti-jihadist discourse by 
expanding its limits from a military perspective to a full-scale warfare in his 
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interview with Literarni Noviny periodical on January 15,2015 by the following 
words : “We need to fight terrorists because they are killing innocent people, and we 
have to defend these people. This is the most important and urgent method to deal 
with it. But if we want to talk about the crisis, fighting terrorism doesn’t need an 
army, but needs good policies. We should fight ignorance with culture and 
education, should build a good economy to fight poverty, and there should be an 
exchange of information among the countries concerned with fighting terrorism."173 
During the same speech, the President declared the enemy by their names by saying 
“We are fighting all sorts of terrorists, whether ISIS, Jabhet al-Nusra, or others"174 
al-Assad thus said the main objective of the greater campaign: "The biggest victory 
today is to eliminate terrorism, terrorists and terrorist thinking. ….If we do not fight 
terrorism, we are deceiving ourselves.  Fighting terrorism is the priority now."175 
On August 29, 2012 President Bashar al-Assad propounded his policy towards 
jihadism in his interview with Addounia TV and said “Solving the crisis is not only 
through the elimination of terrorism, or through force. We have to use all possible 
means including tolerance. That is why we continue to embrace this policy."176 
Same doctrine that spoken with different words on 4th of June 2012 by President of 
Syrian Arab Republic, Bashar al-Assad in Syrian National Assembly. He concluded 
that “Terrorism will not be able to break our people's will; and proud Syria will 
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remain the heart of pan-Arabism and the castle of steadfastness. It will regain its 
health and foil the attempts of haters and conspirators and will again witness their 
disgraceful defeat."177 
On January 7,  2013, President Bashar al-Assad delivered a speech in Damascus 
Opera Hall about ongoing issues in Syria and  openly employed an anti-jihadi 
discourse as a parent state . He continues as follows : “….They have killed civilians 
and the innocent in order to kill light and brightness in our country. They have 
assassinated qualified and distinguished people in order to spread their ignorance 
over our minds”178 
President al-Assad during his same speech directly mentioned Jihadi movements 
functioning in Syria as follows :”Takfiris179 were working at the back rows through 
bombings and mass killing, leaving the armed gangs at the front line, but the unity of 
the Syrian people and army forced them to move to fighting at the front lines where 
they led the rudder of a ship of blood, killing and mutilation. Because takfiri thought 
is alien to our country, they had to import it from abroad, whether through terrorists 
or thought. Thus, takfiris, terrorists, al-Qaeda members calling themselves Jihadis 
streamed from everywhere to command the combat operations on the ground. The 
gunmen, having failed, retreated to the backlines as aides in acts of kidnapping, 
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pillaging and sabotage, as servants, and at best, guides who spy on their fellow 
citizens to serve criminals takfiris who only speak the language of slaughtering and 
mangling.”180 
President al-Assad continued in the same speech “We are fighting those, most of 
whom are non-Syrians, who came for twisted concepts and fake terms they call 
Jihad, but nothing can be farther from Jihad and Islam. “181 
President Bashar Al-Assad opined that the discourse being used in the field (since 
1970s-80s) against his regime is flavored with Islamic intonation. On this basis he 
believed to disperse two from each other and denounce one of them while accepting 
other. He clarified his ideas in his speech on January 10, 212 in Damascus 
University and said that 'We say that there is a great religion – Islam, and there are 
terrorists taking cover under Islam. Who should we banish: religion or terrorism? 
Do we denounce religion or terrorists? Do we fight those who trade in Islam or fight 
terrorism? The answer is clear: It is not the fault of Islam when there are terrorists 
who take cover under the mantle of Islam.''182 
Yet one another landmark of al-Assad’s stance towards the jihadi actions in general 
and in Syria is clearly uttered in his interview with Al-Thawra Newspaper on July 4 , 
2013 . He said : “Syria has not turned into a land for Jihad. Jihad usually denotes 
benevolence; it is about construction, development, defending the country and the 
messages advocated in religion relating to virtuousness, justice and equality. What 
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is happening in Syria is the complete opposite to the concept of jihad; Syria has 
turned into a land for terrorism.”183 
Building on the statements above, the ruling elites of both partner states, Iraq and 
Syria, take a sword-sharp stance in opposition tode facto state that emerged in their 
lands. Pointing few points before skipping to the next section helps to draw a clearer 
picture. In the discourse of The Islamic State leaders and releases there are several 
points that have been repeatedly made. These are, roughly, thee description of the 
foe ( Shi’a, USA, Coalition, “Apostate Regimes”), the way to be conducted ( fight) 
and the law to be followed and installed ( Divine Law). In the exact opposite 
discourse of Iraq and Syria is adopting a policy that directly targets the discourses of 
The Islamic State. The discourse of the leaders of both parent states repeatedly 
uttered that jihadi groups are a plot, jihadism is something else that it is shown by 
armed and Jihadi groups have no relation nor any link with the Islamic 
doctrine.Furthermore, parent states are inclined to accept the USA-led coalition and 
air operations as long as no ground troops take place. Finally, parent states have an 
inclusive approach and regard the Shia, the Sunni and other groups as indispensible 
parts of the community founded on shared values. That indicates a complete 
contradition on the scale of “Jihadi Discourse”. Thus when one side is taken as “1” 
the other group inevitably nests on “0” on the same scale. This shows us that The 
Islamic State, as a de facto state adopts a more jihadi discourse than its parents states 
do and is the winner in the “competitive jihadism” game.  
                                               
 
183 Studying Syria’s Radical Islamic Organizations (5 July 2013) http://rdnews.tumblr.com/post/54723551188/syria-has-not-
turned-into-a-land-for-jihad-jihad Syrintel,Retrieved 2015-05-30 
 
 
 
96 
Once it is agreed upon that The Islamic State adopts a more jihadi discourse, the 
following section will be about gauging the influence of the jihadist discourse on the 
consolidation of sovereignty, which is the dependent variable.  
 
 4.3. Dependent Variable: Consolidation of Sovereignty 
 
As mentioned previously, the dependent variable of this thesis is the consolidation of 
sovereignty of The Islamic State after its (so far) 2 year long campaign. Although 
the indications of a state are vastly agreed upon and quoted in the Methodology 
chapter of this thesis according to the League of Nations’ criteria, it would be 
unrealistic to expect The Islamic State to meet those requirements at once. Again, 
these qualifications are a permanent population, a defined territory, a functioning 
government and capacity to enter into relationship with other states. However, due to 
the fact that The Islamic State has an incompatible policy, which is warring, the 
other states are unwilling to enter into relationship with it . They also ban their 
population from accessing them as well. Neither is The Islamic State, by its very 
nature, unwilling to enter into such an international relationship.   
Due to these reasons, the first three conditions, which are a defined territory, a 
permanent population and a functioning government, are dealt with in the period 
between late 2013 and mid-2015.  
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 4.3.1. A Defined Population 
 
Population is undoubtedly one of the most important requisites for a political 
entity to be called a “state”. Hence, regardless of the number of individuals that 
make up this population, permanency is important. For the states, de facto or not, it 
is a necessity to have a permanent population. 
However, it is rather challenging to study a de facto state because it is still under 
construction. Moreover, in regards to The Islamic State, there are extra difficulties. 
One of them is that, parents states have not conducted systemic census and there is 
an ambiguity on the population rates. Secondly, both countries have experienced a 
civil war period (Iraq since 2003  and Syria is since 2011) and this has caused 
population loss, displacement inside and outside of these countries. Yet another 
problem is that because The Islamic State is rather a black box and no international 
authority is allowed to get inside its borders, numbers get even more unreliable. 
Thus, there is no sound information about the final situation in terms of population 
count. Thus, I will accept my base values as final well-known numbers and I will 
check final updates for each province in order to get closer to final numbers. 
 
4.3.1.1 Population in Core Territory 
 
The Islamic State has three core zones, which are al-Anbar, Mosul and Al-
Raqqah. These, however, are both names of the provinces as well as of their capitals 
. The rest of the territories like Ramadi, Palmyra, Samarra, Idlib, and Halab areunder 
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the control of al- Baghdadi administration but they are of secondary importance. 
Thus, I will first try to map the population of the three mentioned core provinces and 
then add the current population of secondary annexes.  In Syria, there are 15,8 
million people affected by the war out of 21,5 million of the total population and 
11,4 million are displaced. 7 Million (app.) of them are displaced inside Syria and 
4,5 million sought asylum in other countries mainly in Turkey, Lebanon and Iraq.  
The table below shows the number of internally displaced people (IDP )184. 
 Aleppo: 1.787.000 people                               Deir ez Zor : 441.000 People 
 Rural Damascus: 770.000 People         Damascus: 410,600 People 
 Idleb : 708. 000 People          Lattakia:300.000 People  
 Homs: 506.000 People                     Dar’a : 266.000 People  
 Tartous: 452.000 People                   Hama: 245.500 People   
 Al-Hasekeh : 197.500 People                   Al-Raqqah : 177.000 People 
 Quneitra : 72.000 People                              As-Sweida : 69.000 People 
 
Al-Raqqah is the current capital of The Islamic State. Al-Raqqah governorate 
consists of four districts:Tal Abyadh, Al- Thawrah, Al-Raqqah and A’in A’isa185. 
According to 2010 estimations of the Syrian National Census Office, the total 
amount of Syrian citizens living in Al-Raqqah Governorate( not to be confused with 
Al-Raqqah city) is 921.000. Both The Islamic State and the Western sources share 
the opinion that after The Islamic State captured the province, the population size 
tripled. The Islamic State sources claim that new population is 2 Million due to the 
                                               
 
184  Snap, Regional Analysis Syria,RAS Quarterly, 2014 Issue -3  p.9 
185	ﺔﻈﻓﺎ ﺤﻣ ﺔﻗ ﺮﻟ ا  , Wikipedia, http://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/ﺔﻈﻓﺎ ﺤﻣ ﺔﻗ ﺮﻟ ا  Retrieved 2015-05-31 
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wave of migration towards The Islamic State186Yet According to US Think-Tanks, 
only the size of the capital “Al-Raqqah” is tripled from 220.000 in 2004 census to 
880.000 as of 2015.187 Thus, seeing the other districts as ceteris paribus, with the 
new arrival of 660.000 people to the Al-Raqqah city, the secondary estimation is 
around 1,7 millions ( including births). As can be seen above, 177.000 of this 
number is IDP whereas the origin of the rest is unknown. Besides small cities and 
counties that The Islamic State rules, there are 2 core provinces in Iraq as well.  
Iraq is a war-torn country with an estimated population of 32,7 Million. 188 
According to the United Nations, 2 Millions of the population have immigrated to 
other countries since 2012. 189  In Iraq`, al-Mosul and al-Anbar are two core 
provinces. These are population-dense areas as well. 
As for al-Mosul, the picture remains still. Both The Islamic State and the Iraqi 
Government call it the “Province of Nineweh” as a second name. The province is 
divided into 30 districts. Some of the most populated of them are Al-Mosul with 
1,475 Million, Tal-Afar with 300.000, Sinjar with 166.000 and Tal-Kaif with 
167.000 population according to 2014 estimates.190(Since no census has been held 
for decades, all numbers are based on estimations derived from poll-counts.) Al-
Mosul province, in general, comprises 3,524.000 people within provincial borders.  
                                               
 
186  A Detailed Report in English – Wilaayat Raqqa Thrives Under The Islamic Khilafah” , (May 11, 2015)”  
https://ansarukhilafah.wordpress.com/2015/05/11/a-detailed-report-in-english-wilaayat-raqqa-thrives-undrr-the-islamic-
khilafah/ ansarukhilafah Retreved 2015-05-30 
187  Holiday , Joesph ( March 15, 2015) “ The Opposition Takeover in Al-Raqqa”” 
http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/opposition-takeover-al-raqqa” Retrieved 2015-05-31 
188 UNData, (2015) “Iraq” http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Iraq Retrieved 2015-05-30 
189 Battle for Iraq and Syria in Maps (18 May 2015) http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034”  BBC ,Retrieved 
2015-05-30 
190 Iraq, Population Chart http://www.citypopulation.de/Iraq.html Retrieved 2015-05-31 
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When The Islamic State stormed al-Mosul and seized the province in 2014, these 
calculations and estimations were valid. Nevertheless, with the capturing of al-
Mosul province, internal displacements occurred within Iraqi especially from al-
Mosul to other provinces.  
When The Islamic State entered into al-Mosul province, it is claimed that around 
half a million (estimation) residents fled from the province.191 
 
Upon the raid of The Islamic State, demographics of Ninewah province changed 
drastically. As of May 7, 2015, IDP’s from Ninewah Province constitute the %36 of 
the total IDPs of Iraq, which is around 1,058,238 people. 192 Yet, for a more precise 
calculation, two more parameters should be taken into consideration. The first one is 
the people displaced within the borders of Ninewah Province while thesecond is the 
people who turned back (returnees). 
According to the Displacement Tracking Matrix XX of May 15, Ninewah hosts 
190,836 IDP’s that constitute  %6 of the total population of IDP’s in Iraq.193 
Ninewah both accepted and sent IDPs between April 2014 and May 2015. While the 
number of people who left Ninewah was 1.058.238 people, 190,836 people came to 
it.  187,548 of the new arrivers changed their locations within Ninewah Province194. 
As of May 2015, 41.946 people who formerly left Ninewah came back to their 
province. 
                                               
 
191 Robertson,Nick& Smith-Spart, Laura ( 11 June 2014) “ Fresh off Mosul victory, militants in Iraq wrest control of Tikrit” 
https://web.archive.org/web/20140612004130/http://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/11/world/meast/iraq-violence/index.html CNN 
Middle East, Retrieved 2015-05-31 
192 Ibid. Footnote 183. 
193 Ibid. 
194 Ibid. 
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Before gauging the estimated size of the current population, displacements before 
June 2014 should be borne in mind as well. According to ACAPS’s displacement 
profile195, as of 25th of June 2014, 500.000 people were displaced from al-Mosul 
compared to 85.000 people displaced from Tal-Afar. 140.000 of whom displaced 
within the borders of al-Ninawah. That makes a total count of 446.000 people 
displaced to other provinces (mostly Kurdish populated cities) of Iraq. And after 
June 2015, as was calculated above, 828.744 people displaced outside the al-
Ninewah Province. In total, 1.374.744 people left Al-Ninewah  since end of 2013 
from the al-Ninewah province. Previous population o was 3.524.000 and2.150.000 is 
supposed to people live within the borders of al-Ninewah Province. This number is 
nearly consistent with the size of population given by The Islamic State and United 
Nation as well. Al-Anbar is the third core province under the rule of The Islamic 
State. Al-Anbar Governorate has 7 main districts some of them are Ramadi, 
Fallujah, al-Baghdadi,al-Anbar, Terbil and Kabisa. The last census was made in 
2003 and population was 1,5 million people.  As of 2014 it was estimated that 1,65 
million people live in al-Anbar governorate. Number of total displacement until May 
7, 2015 is 465.480 out of which 446.454 people displaced within the borders of al-
Anbar governorate. Thus, between April 2014 and May 2015 number of displaced 
people is 19.026 people.  
According to the United Nations Databank, there are more  displacements between 
January and April of 2014. According to the UN Refugee Agency, the number of 
displaced peoplebetween those dates is 63.008 families. Among them 42.059 
                                               
 
195 Iraqi Displacement Profile, (4th of July 2014),” 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/iraq_displacement_profile_4_july_2014.pdf” ACAPS  Retrieved 2015-05-
31 
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families moved into al-Anbar Province and 20.949 families fled away to al-Anbar 
Province 196 . Thus, approximately 126.000 people fled from al-Anbar province 
between these dates. The final campaign of the Shi’a militia and the Iraqi forces 
against The Islamic State caused another immigration wave in al-Anbar between 
May 24th-25th , 2015. According to OCHA(Office for The Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs), this final campaign caused 11.539 families to displace, of 
which 9.803 are still inside the al-Anbar province. 197  With the  information 
presented above, it can be said that although the percentage of total displacement 
within the governorates is rather high, inter-governorate displacements are of utmost 
importance. For al-Anbar, the population size that re-placed to other governorates is 
157.000 people. Which for today, makes a population of around 1,35 million. 
In line with the population data examined above, it is clear that the population 
residing in the “core territory” of The Islamic State is about 5,1 millions of people. 
However, there are other densely populated cities apart from these governorates and 
those should be added to this number as well. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
196 Emergency Response for Internally Displaced People in Anbar, Iraq, supplementary Budget Appeal (March 2014) ,”” 
http://www.unhcr.org/532030669.pdf UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency  Retrieved 2015-06-01 p.3 
197  OCHA Flash Update, Iraq Crisis-Anbar Displacement , (24-25 May 2015), 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ocha_flash_update_no._6_-_anbar_displacement_24-25_may_2015.pdf  
ReliefWeb  Retrieved 2015-06-01 
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4.3.1.2 Population in Other Settlements 
 
Apart from the aforementioned core territory that comprises al-Anbar, al-Nineweh 
and al-Raqqah directorates, The Islamic State also owns other populated settlements 
both in Iraq and  Syria.  The Islamic State captured “ Jurf al Sakhar” city in Babylon 
governorate in March 2014 with 80.000 estimated population within.198 In June 2014 
's offensive, The Islamic State forces assaulted and captured 4 settlements within 
Kirkuk province of Iraq.199 Al-Hawija city being the largest among them both by 
size of territory and population of 451.00 people,  the total population of all four 
settlements makes up to 0,6 million residents in Iraq. 
As for Syria, The Islamic State currently occupies settlements in Hasaka, Aleppo 
and Deir al-Zawr governorates apart from al-Raqqah. In Deir al-zawr, The Islamic 
State holds Mayadin and al-Bukamal provinces which combined population  
amounts to  750.000 people.200 In Hasaka governorate, al-Baghdadi’s administration 
rules Shaddadeh(15.000) , Markada and al-Arish districts which in total makes 
90,095 people. And in Aleppo, The Islamic State controls Jarablus and Manbij cities 
with their 467.000 population combined.201  
                                               
 
198 Sender, Hanna, (June 12, 2014) “ Map of ISIS Controlled Cities in Iraq”, http://www.ibtimes.com/map-isis-controlled-
cities-iraq-1599768” International Business Times Retrieved 2015-06-01 
199 Ibid. 
200  General Census Office, ( March 2011) , “Deir al Zawr, 
“http://www.cbssyr.org/new%20web%20site/General_census/census_2004/NH/TAB09-1-2004.htm Retrieved 2015-06-01 
201 Ibid. 
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In Syria and Iraq, the estimation of the population size under the rule of The Islamic 
State is 1.987.000 people. When the population in core territories is added this 
number reaches  7 million people.  
To summarize the section this study highlighting the population element, it should 
be said that there is no available and updated sources about the fluxes entering or 
exiting  the territory under the rule of The Islamic State. It is especially impossible 
to estimate the number of foreigners who immigrated to The Islamic State. In 
contrast, it is possible to make estimations by calculations that consider IDP’s 
refugees as is done above. As the aftermath, the number of people living under the 
rule of The Islamic State regime is estimated  around 7 millions and there is no 
indication as to mass emigration from city centers that are not exposed to war with 
the Syrian forces or other factions.  one year after the announcement of the caliphate, 
the  7 million   population claimed by al-Baghdadi administration is confirmed as 
shown above and this indicates a positive outcome.  
 
4.3.2. A Defined Territory 
 
The Islamic State portrays a unique entity in world politics. It wages war against its 
parent states –Syria and Iraq-, local insurgent groups ( ranging from jihadists to 
Kurdish PYD) , Lebanon, Hizballah, United States, Canada, UK, France and 60+ 
countries. This necessitates an ever-lasting war period and it is not surprising to 
observe territorial gains and losses of The Islamic State.  
This study, therefore, analyzes the territories under the rule of The Islamic State in 
two categories. On the one hand, as mentioned before, Al-Ninwah, Al-Anbar and 
 
 
105 
Al-Raqqah provinces are regarded as the core territories. On the other hand, The 
Islamic State also controls side territories in which its domination is fragile and 
disputed.   
 The Islamic State captured al-Ninewah province from the Iraqi forces after 3 days-
long rush operations in early June 2014.202  Comprising 30 districts, al-Ninewah 
governorate occupies 37,300 km2 of earth. Al-Raqqah of Syria is another province 
that is fully under the control of al-Baghdadi and moreover al-Raqqah city is 
announced to be the first capital city of The Islamic State.  By attempting to annex 
al-Raqqah in June 2013, The Islamic State challenged  Jabhat al Nusra and regime 
forces. The Islamic State announced its uncontested superiority over al-Raqqah in 
January 2014.203 The province occupies 19.616 km2   and is located in upper-mid of 
the Syria. Al-Anbar is the final core-territory slice of The Islamic State and this 
predominantly Sunni populated province is on the Syrian border of Iraq. Divided 
into 39 settlements and 7 main districts, al-Anbar is the largest portion of Iraq by the 
territorial size.  
Anbar is a vastly Sunni populated tribal province alienated from Iraqi affairs by 
being exposed to sectarian and authoritarian policies of pro-Shi’a Nouri al-Maliki.204 
Thus, the coming of The Islamic State is hugely welcomed by the residents of the al-
                                               
 
202  Al-Salhy, Suadad & Arango , Tim (10 June 2014) “ Sunni Militants Drive Iraqi Army Out of Mosul” 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/11/world/middleeast/militants-in-mosul.html?_r=0 The New York Times , Retrieved 2015-
06-02 
203 A Mysterious Fall of Raqqah, Syria’s Kandahar” (11 August 2013) http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/17550 Al-Akhbar 
Retrieved 2015-06-02 
204  Boghani, Priyanka, ( 28 October 2014) “In Their Own Words : Sunnis on Their Treatment in Maliki’s Iraq” 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/iraq-war-on-terror/rise-of-isis/in-their-own-words-sunnis-on-their-treatment-in-
malikis-iraq/  Frontline ,Retrieved 2015-06-02 
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Anbar province. Although The Islamic State started a campaign for capturing al-
Anbar (and captured Fallujah and Ramadi) in January 2014, the Iraqi Army 
launched a counter offensive in June –July 2014. During the fall offensives in 
September-October 2014, the governorate was re-captured by The Islamic State. Al-
Anbar’s 138,500 km2  area caused The Islamic State to gain a momentum and a 
strategic depth helped the invasion of Dair al Zawr of Syria due to the geopolitical 
leverage because of the territorial characteristics of the provinceAl-Anbar. 
In addition to  calculating  only core territory, which means 196.000 km2 of 
uncontested dominancy, The Islamic State also controls some other parts of Iraq and 
Syria. 
The Islamic State has  control of Dair al Zawr governorate except its capital city, 
dair al zawr. Comprised of 3 main districts, Dair al Zawr governorate has 33.000  
km2   surface area 20.000 of which is under the rule of al-Baghdadi. In Haseke 
governorate of  Syria, 12.000 km2 out of 23.300 km2  belong to The Islamic State’s 
rule. With 12 Districts and nearly 5 millions of population, Aleppo is also partly 
under the occupation of The Islamic State. Peripheral parts of ‘Ain al Arab alongside 
Jarablus and Manbij are being controlled by al-Baghdadi which makes 6.000 km2 
out of 18,500 km2.  .Jurf Al Sakhar is another province under the control of The 
Islamic State. Located within the borders of Kirkuk Governorate of Iraq, Jusrf al 
Sakhar occupies 700 km2 Hawija, one third of the Kirkuk governorate by size, is also 
under the direct command of The Islamic State and occupies 4.000 km2  in Iraq. And 
finally The Islamic State launched its final offensive to ancient city of Palmyra and 
as of May 22, 2015, The Islamic State captured the city that is located in the borders 
of Homs Governorate. By  capturing  20.000 km2 of area from  Homs, The Islamic 
State has  96.000 km2 only in whichyria  makes up half of the country. Thus, The 
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Islamic State controls 196.000 km2 as core territory and nearly 60.000 km2 as side 
territory. When the expanding and re-capturing of the lost provinces trend is 
analyzed , one can argue that The Islamic State is able to keep its core territory 
incontestably under its own ruling and conducts an expansionist-jihadist policy 
although it gains or loses momentum in side territories from time to time. 
As for defined territory, just like the size of population, it is not strictly defined what 
should be tool for territorial definition. Russia Federation and Canada can be equally 
treated with Monaco and Djibouti although there is an immense gap as to their 
surface areas. Borders are not required to be fixed as well and may shrink or expand 
like Israel expanded several times after 1948. However, what is sought is a 
functioning government that rules over these territories. The following section will 
be about The Islamic State’s governing capabilities. 
   
4.3.3. A Functioning Government 
 
According to international customary law codes that regulate statehood of political 
entities there is one more requirement to be met, which is a functioning government. 
The type of regime and government is not specified. It should be noted that there is a 
gap in the Montevideo Agreement on the definition of “ functioning” . Although it 
implies the control over the territories, level of control is not defined or specified. 
Thus , the United States of America and Mali are both sovereign states although 
their level of control over their territories are fairly distant from each other. 
The Islamic State arose with the claim of  statehood and has initiated an assertive 
state building agenda.  
 
 
108 
Under this section, this paper will analyze military structure, organizational structure 
and media organization of The Islamic State and its social policies. 
 
4.3.3.1. Military 
 
The military structure and capacity of The Islamic State is a  field studied  by think-
tanks and US Military bodies. Annual reports of The Islamic State (al-Naba), which 
are published in Arabic language, offer great deal of information about this topic. 
According to such annual reports, the attack types are as follows: 
Assassination       Bombing 
Setting houses on fire      Suicide Vests  
Armed Attacks      Rocket  
Launchers       SVBIED’s205  
BTRs                   Technicals,  
Main Battle Tanks      Artillery 
 
Moreover, The Islamic State has a well-organized army organization with a 
functioning army chain from top to bottom.206 Moreover, this military force is not 
focused only on one or two fronts but is capable to carry out multi-tasks efficiently, 
up to seven districts at once. It also can adapt itself to various battle-types and 
conduct a different kind of attacks (assault, defense, urban warfare etc) at once in 
different provinces. Thus, The Islamic State has rapid and rather versatile army. 
                                               
 
205 Please check abbreviations section. 
206  Marshall, Alex, (November, 9, 2014) “How ISIS got its anthem” ,  
http://www.theguardian.com/music/2014/nov/09/nasheed-how-isis-got-its-anthem  The Guardian Retrieved 05-19-2015. p.9 
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Not only in matter of Blietzkrieg assault The Islamic State is not only 
professionalized in Blietzkreig style assaults but also  adopts several tactics to repel 
the attacks. According to assault it aspires to repel. These are categorized under five 
main chapters. 
The first methodology that The Islamic State performs is called “ Fortified 
Defense”207 in which The Islamic State prepares blockades in the populated areas of 
the city  . It thus  maximizes the enemy death toll, destroys bridges and critical 
infrastructure to keep enemy reinforcements at bay and denies to leave the city. The 
main goal is maximizing the death toll of the enemy. 
Second defense strategy of The Islamic State is called “Area Defense” where The 
Islamic State defends areas under threat by which refers to deploying the land-
mines, anti-tank and anti-personnel mines and counter mobility obstacles in order to 
slow down the enemies to advance towards The Islamic State controlled zones.208 
Third strategy is called “Zone Defense” that is to launch; which requires a surprise 
attack on enemy forces from a distant point in order to dodge the enemy assaults.209 
Fourth strategy is called “Hibernation” during which The Islamic State forces 
remain on hold without assaulting the enemy. The rationale behind this strategy is 
re-gaining power for future operations where The Islamic State forces remain on 
hold in one city alongside forces of enemies of IS without assaulting. This is called 
hibernation because it also regains its power to conduct future operations. 
Fifth and the last strategy of The Islamic State is called “expansion”210 which refers 
to The Islamic State’s operations behind the enemy lines in order to gain new lands 
                                               
 
207  McFate, Jessica Lewis, (May 2015), “ The ISIS Defense in Iraq and Syria :Countering an adaptive Enemy” Middle East 
Security Report ,Institute for the Study of War.p 27 
208 Ibid. 
209 Ibid. 
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and evade from the immediate attack. The Islamic State’s Ain al-Arab operation can 
be given as an example. During December 2014, when the advance of The Islamic 
State was stalled and retreat begun, The Islamic State launched another line in Iraq 
(to Baghdad) and weakened the forces collected in ‘Ain al-Arab of Aleppo. The 
declaration of new provinces (wilayat) in Khorasan, Sinai, and Indonesia are further 
examples for the fifth method. 
The Islamic State utilizes different tactics for its attacks as well. 
First one is conventional regular warfare where they behave like modern nation 
armies in the field by utilizing main battle tanks, artilleries, armors and et cetera and 
this is to use gain terrains.211 
Second one is the asymmetric warfare by which The Islamic State disrupts enemy 
forces and causes havoc and dissidence by infiltrating among them, assassinating 
their leaders or officers and utilizing explosions strapped on the chests or in the cars. 
Third tactic is using terror as a tool to cause intimidation among people and security 
forces and cause immediate fear.212  
The fourth one is to use Cyber Warfare to disseminate ideas, making calls for jihad, 
propagating their assaults and showing executions or the ability to hack the systems 
of the USA and the Israeli systems. This method is rather new and unwelcomed yet. 
The Islamic State has advantages regarding the composition of army as well. 
Especially four elements help The Islamic State to fight fiercely. 
Firstly, the jihadist ideology and the effect of faith help forces to fight more 
vehemently. Moreover, this helps to upsurge in the number of suicide attacks where 
needed because of the promised reward for those who do it. 
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Secondly, as mentioned before, former Ba’athist officers helped The Islamic State to 
form a regular hierarchy rather than dispersed units lacking command chain.  
As for the thirdly, experienced warriors from Afghanistan, Caucasia, Bosnia, 
Kashmir and elsewhere influxed to the Khilafa upon the call of al-Baghdadi and this 
caused an upsurge in battling experience total. 
Fourthly, although there is a central command chain in military structure, The 
Islamic State conducts two policies regarding their commanders. Firstly, it makes 
them get married to daughters of local Sunni tribes in order to prevent them from 
rising as warlords. Secondly, commanders in the field are provided semi-autonomy 
to prevent   from losing time by bureaucratic processes and gives them stamina and 
strength during the operations.  
The main objective of military operations of The Islamic State is not gaining 
territories. The Islamic State has two parameters for launching an offensive to a 
place: population and resources. It can be seen that, The Islamic State military is 
striving to gather all sunni-populated areas under its own flag. If a province has 
natural resources like oil  and gas or power sources like dams and generators,  
regardless of the religion of its residents ,it is a natural target for it.213 
There are speculations about the exact number of the military power of the IS. 
Foreign intelligence services estimate the number of army to be around 32.000 
manpower. It is a well-known fact that most of the people joining to The Islamic 
State’s army are from Arab lands, the locals of Syria and Iraq excluded. Saudi 
Arabia, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan are first top four tier by combined 16.000 
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participation.214 United Kingdom, France, Russia, Turkey and Germany are the other 
countries on the top ten of the list.215 
 
4.3.3.2. Organizational Structure 
 
One of the features of The Islamic State that differentiates the entity from 
other jihadi groups like Al-Qai’dah is their skill in organizing a state bureaucracy. 
By doing so, The Islamic State  enables itself to reach outer spaces with effective 
methods due to a functioning system. 
The Islamic State has adopted a well-established organizational structure.  In this 
structure, al-Baghdadi is the supreme ruler under whose supreme command  s are 
two senior advisors. Currently, both of these advisors are ex-Ba’athists. Each 
advisor is responsible of one country, Iraq and Syria. This can be said as first circle 
of leadership. 
On second circle, there are the councils. This council structure has six sub-councils 
which are Provincial Council, Military Council, Security and Intelligence Council, 
Religious Affairs, Finance Affairs and Media Relations. 216  Directly under al-
Baghdadi, there is a “cabinet” called “Shura Council” and there is also a “divan” 
called “ Shari’a Council whose members are the notable figures of The Islamic State 
                                               
 
214  Saudis Most likely to join ISIS, %10 of group’s fighters are women” (20 october 2014) 
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Middle East Monitor, Retrieved 2015-06-02 
215  Withnall, Adam ( 23 June 2014) “ Iraqi Crisis : Isis ‘has recruited at least 1500 Britons’ to fight abroad, warns 
BirminghamMP” http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/iraq-crisis-isis-has-recruited-at-least-1500-britons-to-
fight-abroad-warns-birmingham-mp-9556790.html The Independent Retrieved 2015-06-02 
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like al-Shishani and al-Adnani. Not as a “ministry” similar to the ones in Shura 
Council but there are six more posts for secondary issues. These are Supervisor of 
IEDs, Supervisor of logistics, Supervisor of guesthouses and suicide bombers, 
Supervisor of prisoners, Supervisor of affairs of women and orphans and there is 
spokesman.217 This is mostly considered as a normally functioning organization with 
its well built structure and hierarchy. 
Media organization of The Islamic State is rather important and directly organized 
under the Shura council. Media operations are held in de-centralized bodies such as 
nearly autonomous media bodies. Media warfare is being conducted by multiple 
several thousand subscriber owner YouTube accounts at once until they get 
suspended, or Blogs  or anonymous websites like Archive.org and Justpaste.it and 
most importantly by Twitter accounts. By the help of these accounts ,people are 
being informed  of news instantly through first hand  source.s. Moreover, because it 
is challenging to track them down and suspend in a very short time, it is folding its 
effectiveness. In The Islamic State these kinds of operations are conducted by media 
organs, which can be, analyzed under two categories. The first  category is the 
official and non-autonomous media outlets. These are al-Furqan, Al-Hayat, Ajnad 
and al-I’tisam Media foundations. These outlets are specialized on publishing online 
magazines and HD propaganda videos. The second category comprises of semi-
autonomous media outlets of which every wilayat should have. There are 28 semi 
autonomous media outlets, some of which are  “Wilayat al-Anbar”, “Wilayat Gharb 
Afriqiya”” Wilayat Sinai” and “ Wilayat Tarabulus”. These organizations are 
publishing videos and news regarding their own territories. And, finally, The Islamic 
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State media warfare is carried on the shoulders of “twitter Jihad”. Millions of 
supporters distribute these releases and publications via twitter 
The Islamic State uses such media means in order to create original, cult and 
charismatic heroes or very extraordinary characters. Notorious “ Jihadi John” who 
beheaded Peter Kassig, James Foley, Kenji Goto and many others has undoubtedly 
become a very important symbol. Moreover he was continuing this by rehearsing 
what Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi started in Iraq and as mentioned before, he quoted 
directly from him.And a final example is “ Abu Umar al Shishani” who became a 
very powerful figure by such campaign especially during ‘Ain al Arab campaign of 
The Islamic State. 
Apart from these, The Islamic State keeps law-enforcement forces functioning 
within the cities and opens courts, universities and built roads and opens customer 
service hubs. The departments below organize these affairs; 218 
The Media Department 
The Judiciary Court& Public Complaint Department 
The Health Department 
The Donation, Daawah and Mosque Department 
The Hisbah (Inspection) Office 
The Education Office 
The Public Security Department 
The Agriculture & Irrigation Department 
The Police Department 
They Zakat Department  
The Public Service Department.  
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It is compulsory on each and every wilayah to install and operate these departments 
as they are counted as the main responsibility of the rule for the people who reside 
under IS’s rule. 
The Islamic State re-shapes the curriculum according to their ideology and the 
universities actively function in al-Mosul , al-Anbar and elsewhere.219 Moreover, 
The Islamic State  delivers passports220, prints ID cards with advanced chipsets,221 
applies penalties on people, mints money from genuine golden and silver 222and 
copper.223  
The Islamic State also conducts an efficient taxation policy within its sovereignty 
zone. Mainly under two categories, Muslim and Non-Muslim, people are obliged to 
pay zakat (for Muslims) and jizyah224(for non Muslims)225. Also because of the 
ideology that they follow  , electricity and water, medicine and health services, as 
well as educational services are supplied for free. 
                                               
 
219  Nabeel, Gilgamesh (25 November 2014)” The Islamic State’s Plan for Universities” http://www.al-
fanarmedia.org/2014/11/islamic-states-plan-universities/  Al –Fanar Media, Retrieved 2015-06-03 
220  ISIS allegedly issues “ Caliphate” passport” “(5 July 2014) http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-
east/2014/07/05/ISIS-allegedly-issues-caliphate-passport.html Al-Arabiya Retrieved 2015-06-03 
221  “ISIS issuing Photo IDs in Syrian Stronghold Raqqa”(17 April 2015) http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-
east/2015/04/17/ISIS-issuing-photo-IDs-in-Syrian-stronghold-Raqqa.html Al-Arabiya. Retrieved 2015-06-03 
222  The Islamic State,(2015) ”https://ia802704.us.archive.org/17/items/TheIslamicState2015-
FullEbook/TheIslamicState2015FullEbook.pdf Archive Retrieved 2015-06-03 
223  ISIS to mint own Islamic dinar coins in gold ,silver and copper” (Novermber 2014) 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/14/isis-gold-silver-copper-islamic-dinar-coins The Guardian, Retrieved 2015-
06-03 
224  Convert, pay tax,or die. The Islamic State warns Christians” (Friday 18, 
2014)”http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/18/us-iraq-security-christians-idUSKBN0FN29J20140718 Reuters Retrieved 
2015-06-03 
225  If fact, Zakat and Jizyah are not taxation but there is no English vocabulary stressing same meaning. 
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As can be seen, The Islamic State is effectively building a state apparatus in the 
modern sense. One of them is its military wing, which dominates the agenda. 
However, in addition to that, The Islamic State is involved in a state-building 
process within its borders Thus as Safia Auode asserted, The Islamic State is posing 
a challenge to Meta statehood narratives by its new position.226 Consequently, The 
Islamic State fights against Iraq and Syria by pointing out its jihadist ideology. As a 
result of this, The Islamic State gains credits and invests this credit into its sui 
generis state building campaign. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
BRIDGING THE GAP 
 
 
 
World politics is going through a turbulence period. This turbulence is being 
resulted with different facts in different places on earth. Middle East, on the other 
hand is one of the hotspots of these changes and turbulence. Occupations, wars, 
insubordinations, regime changes and finally born of a new entities are immediate 
and observable outcomes so far. Iraq and Syria, beyond all, are hosting all of these 
changes within their borders including witnessing of emerging new entities. 
However, this new entities are introducing brand new concepts to contemporary 
world politics. Moreover, at the background of this novel transformation are 
sometimes coalition of former rivalries like Ba’athitst and Islamists. This new kind 
of synthesis is producing unexpected political entities like the Islamic State.  
This new political entity is claiming a political autonomy and sovereignty over a 
territory that is shared by two adjacent states. In addition to this, the Islamic State is 
adopting an administrative body and policy that challenges entire international 
regime. Because of current international regime is built on sovereign state-oriented 
Westphalian system and working on defined behavior codes (i.e. International law 
codes, diplomatic customary et cetera), such new entity has become a subject of this 
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established codes, theories and reflexes. 
Clearly seen that familiar state-oriented method of analyzing the Islamic State is not 
functioning properly. There are important reasons to explain this. First, the Islamic 
State is not defining itself with contemporary world policy tools. It has new identity, 
new tools and new end-goals. As for second, the Islamic State is utterly challenging 
pillars of modern international relations rules and highlighting that it has no desire to 
settle down. Thirdly, no previous grand theory or approach was developed or used in 
such case and this is causing confusion as to methodology of dealing with the 
political entity in the field and the radicalization/propagation process. Fourthly, the 
Islamic State has developed enough skills in military, propaganda, and 
institutionalization and established a working administration and this was 
unexpected from a organizations that is labeled as terrorist. 
As James Rosenau states, world politics go through turbulence when two of three 
levels starts to change at once. Today, it is observable that in the Middle East scale 
especially; micro and macro levels are being changed simultaneously.  
It is clear that there is a need for a new theoretic tool to understand de facto states 
with jihadi identities. However, there are two complications as to fulfill such 
observation. One of which is the Islamic State is displaying ordinary de facto state 
behavior which is to strive for recognition by their targeted audience and to survive 
on the other hand it has built a new identity that differentiates the Islamic State from 
other de facto states. Another complication is that any grand theory is incapable to 
explain the Islamic State and their actions.  
 In this paper competitive jihadism  is offered to define and recognize the major 
reasons that a jihadi de facto state may born into and especially how it organize itself 
and its ideology to survive and gain recognition. Competitive jihadism is basically a 
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set of actions derived from jihad as ideology and jihadist policies as way of 
implementing this ideology against less- jihadist groups or to other jihadist groups 
with more jihadist policies. This notion is primarily empowered by Rosenau’s 
turbulence approach when explaining the dynamics of the jihadist policies and its 
relations with general world politics meanwhile it uses Caspersen’s competitive 
democratization while explaining why a jihadi de facto state is actually uses 
jihadism as primary tool. 
James Rosenau suggests that there should be change in two levels to talk about 
turbulence. For the Islamic State case, it is broadly applicable approach to 
understand the reality in the field. The Islamic State emerged from the change in 
micro level and macro level. As can be found in the previous chapter, perception 
changes of ex-Ba’ath members and change of how Sunnite relocated their identity 
constituted and reshaped micro level changes. These two changes inevitable have 
these two groups to espouse each other. Today, the Islamic State’s main driving 
force is not a composition of these two groups by coincidence. Once they espouse 
each other against common opponent, this process caused their perception to change 
and unify towards to it as Rosenau’s micro level change expects. Their caliphate and 
caliph creating procedure should also be taken as their collective identity building 
process. Which is also suggested by Rosenau by under the name of change of micro 
level. 
However, this entity started to challenge two sorts of enemies.  One of them is their 
challenge with parent states. This challenge is posed to both international state-
oriented system and to ideology of the system. Thus, it is safe to argue that this 
challenge is macro level challenge. Second group is their conflict with other local 
groups be it jihadi groups or ethnic-ideology based entities. This level is a part of 
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micro level. In this level the Islamic State is creating a jihadist policy and getting 
into competition with other power focuses as I call it competitive jihadism. Although 
turbulence approach offers us a scope to understand when and why these changes 
occur, it doesn’t really give the answer of “ how”.  It is vital to understand why a de 
facto state may pursue an ideology based policy especially this ideology is not 
compatible with contemporary world politics.  
As Nina Caspersen argued, a de facto state competes with their parent states for 
recognition in international system and tries to guarantee its survival by getting into 
competition with parent state over the democratic promises. The more democratic 
policy a de facto state adopts the more recognition it gets Caspersen argues. 
However, it is impossible to apply this rule on a political entity that doesn’t aim to 
get recognition from established world policy agents, sovereign states. The Islamic 
State designates the Muslim community as their target audience and so competes 
over this population instead of sovereign state system. Thus, competitive 
democratization is channelized to Muslim community and is transformed to 
competitive jihadism. 
The competitive jihadism norm constitutes the micro-macro level of change in 
politics. This new theoretic approach will link the gaps between fact and the theory 
and will help to understand cause-effect linkages between contemporary world 
politics and jihadi de facto states. The Islamic State linked its change in micro levels 
as stressed above and its challenge that posed to international system by using their 
micro-macro level brigde, jihadist policies namely. These policies helped the Islamic 
State to attract the attention of their targeted audience. These jihadist policies are 
highlighted in the fourth chapter. Establishing a caliphate, installing shari’a law, 
accepting jihad as primary discoursal subject, appointing opponents and competing 
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them especially using putting jihad forward helped the Islamic State to propagate 
itself and to gain fighters, citizens and recognition.  
As can be seen clearly, as a jihadi de facto state, the Islamic State, utilized the same 
methodology with a regular democratic de facto state and competes their parents in 
jihadism. This created a link between micro and macro levels of turbulence. Leaders 
of the Islamic State devised jihadism policy as a bridge between micro and macro 
levels , micro-macro level namely. 
This micro-macro level of turbulence is not directed to the parent states only. The 
Islamic State launched this all out war to other factions in the field as well in order 
to gain recognition by the Muslim community and gain fighting manpower. 
Although sharing similar end-goal and ideologies, fight between the Islamic State 
and once its branch Jabhat al Nusra as can be best explained as well by using 
competitive jihadism. Because ultimately manpower to be shared is the most 
important source for both parent states and the de facto factions on the field.  
It can be seen on the chapter four how the Islamic State called all Muslims to fight in 
their ranks and reminded about the consequences if they don’t participate in. It 
should be noted that this discourse policy is feeding the Islamic State in every angle 
possible. This is why the admiral ship of jihadist policies of the Islamic State is the 
speeches of the leaders and paralleling publications. As can be seen on the 
hypothesis testing chapter, the more the Islamic States successfully challenges its 
opponents the more it consolidates its sovereignty. This consolidation process is 
becoming a state building period that longs for a further nation building process. It 
should be borne in mind that this micro-macro level successfully established by the 
Islamic State that uses jihadism as its state identity. 
The Islamic State has been displaying a policy portrait that is fully compatible with 
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dynamics of the new power vacuum in Syrian soil and in Iraq and is creating a 
stability hub for building a state. This is indeed how a de facto state expected to 
born. As there is a power vacuum and turbulence, the Islamic State has launched an 
ideology that built its legitimacy on it. This ideology, jihadism, linked the two levels 
of turbulence of each other. To have more power and to survive, the Islamic State 
wishes this turbulence to remain until it guarantees its survival and recognition. As 
Caspersen argued, it is in the nature of de facto states. So does the Islamic State 
benefit this power vacuum and turbulence by creating competition with parent states. 
It builds a narration and it acts according to that narration. This action is to launch 
wars, release messages, displaying theatric executions, building infrastructure, 
schools and namely building a state and a nation. In this zero-sum game with the 
parent states, the more a side acquires human resource the more that part gets closer 
to victory. Competitive jihadism reasoning helps to understand why there is such a 
brutal warfare on media and propagation as well as war of discourses as well by 
appreciating the role of manpower for the competition for both sides. Moreover it 
gives an insight into how a jihadi de facto state builds its legitimacy and how it 
differentiates from non-jihadi de facto states  
In this study, I examined the effect of jihadi policies on consolidation of a de facto 
state’s sovereignty by comparing discourses and policies of a jihadi de facto state 
and its parent states and the results showed that when a jihadi de facto state 
implemented a successful competition campaign, it will consolidate its state building 
process. 
As to recapitulate, the research on the Islamic State case showed us that when a 
jihadi de facto state successfully implements a more jihadist policy than their parent 
states, its will consolidate its sovereignty in correlation. 
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  CHAPTER SIX 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The Islamic State adopts a jihadist policy and could be coded as “1” while 
the parent states which are the Arab Republic of Syria and Republic of Iraq reject 
the idea of jihadism and could be coded as “0” in the jihadi policy implementing 
scale. 
There is a certain difference between The Islamic State and its parent states as to 
their stands towardsthe doption of jihadi discourse. While The Islamic State is 
utilizing jihadi discourse in every opportunity it can get, its parent states are 
especially abstaining from such discourse and displaying a rather contrasting view. 
This fact indeed produces a healthy environment to test the hypothesis because both 
parent states and the de facto state are at the other ends of jihadi discourse scale. All 
the empirical evidences show this result literally without one single exception. Thus, 
it is safe to argue that The Islamic State is the uncontested winner of the competitive 
jihadism game. 
In regards to the hypothesis presented in this study ,the winner of the competitive 
jihadism is supposed to consolidate its sovereignty. This study shows that The 
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Islamic State is able to keep its sovereignty, to install order, to have a functioning 
government and to attract the militants from the various parts of the globe227. On the 
other hand, it is apparent that the Syrian and Iraqi governments have lost their 
control over their territories. In other words, these parent states are unable exert their 
sovereignty rights stemming from Westphalian system. 
The achievements of The Islamic State are the product of its attraction, which stems 
from its jihadist policy. Such jihadism has created a safe haven for those who 
discontent the status quo in the region and the global order. Therefore ,state building 
efforts and the foreign fighters, Sunni tribes, ex- Ba’ath officers and local people 
contributed to the expansionist strategy of The Islamic State.  
The Islamic State, contrary to its image in the media is not an entity composed of 
radical gangs which aim to produce terror. Although its methodology in expanding 
its sphere of influence could be legitimately regarded as barbaric by international 
community ,The Islamic State’s goal such as creating a functioning government and 
building a state apparatus could be examined by the concepts of the modern state. 
Thus, The Islamic State presents a complicated picture, which portrays an entity 
using illegitimate instruments to reach a legitimate conclusion. 
In the final analysis, it is clear that The Islamic State’s ambition to establish a state 
espoused by its jihadi policy yielded a positive outcome. Thus, this study shows that 
de facto states that have jihadi characteristics get in a jihadi discourse competition 
with their parents states to attract attention of their targeted audience, gain 
recognition by it and ultimately  gain legitimacy on the basis of their constitutive 
                                               
 
227 Please regard to Haldun Yalçınkaya’s “ International Cooperation Against Foreign Terrorist Fighters : The Experience of 
Turkey” for further information. 
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ideology. This study revealed a positive correlation between a successful jihadi 
discourse campaign of a de facto state and the consolidation level of its sovereignty. 
This study draws an analytic framework and puts  forward a tool for the future 
researches. Moreover, it shows that new decades world politics will witness more 
jihadi de facto states. Imarat Kavkaz, Somaliland, Taliban, Islamic State, Keshmir 
Islamic Emirate , Islamic State and finally new attempts for it made by Jabhat al 
Nusra and Ahrar al Sham are only few examples of this new trend. Further 
researches could be conducted to determine a possible linkage between jihadi de 
facto states and their interaction with the local population. Another research may be 
conducted about the main roots of this trend and its characteristics. As a 
understudied field, the relationship between cyber jihad and state building process 
should be studied. Sociological background in which jihadi de facto states are born 
remains as an enigma to be solved. 
Additional research in the field of jihadi de facto states will add to the understanding 
about the impact of the jihadi de facto state reality and provide a feedback 
mechanism that will allow future efforts in this area to more fully meet its intended 
goals and objectives. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
 
 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
 
There are some useful terms and concepts in Arabic with their equivalences in the 
English Language. These words are left in their original language in the study 
although they are espoused with their definitions on footnotes. Below are the most 
important ones among them. 
 
Hadith:  Prophetic Sayings and narrations 
Takfir:  Listing a Muslim as an infidel      
Jihad: Stuggling on the path of Allah against  one’s himself    /herself and       
against   the  infidels by all means possible. 
Ummah:  Islamic nation 
Mujahid: Holy Warrior 
Baya(h) :  Oath of allegiance 
Fatwa:   Islamic orders issued by religious authority 
Kaliph: Legally chosen supreme leader of Islamic nation. 
Ayah:  Qur’anic Verse 
Shaheed:  Martyr 
Istishad:   Martyrdom Operation 
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APPENDIX TWO 
 
 
SPEECHES OF “The Spokesman” Al-ADNANI 
 
 
On 21st of September 2014,228 Al-Furqan Media Outlet uploaded a speech of 
al-Adnani, the spokesperson of The Islamic State. The video lasts 41 minutes and 49 
seconds, uploaded in Arabic language under the title  “ Indeed your Lord is Ever 
Watchful.”  I quoted from this speech several times below. Vital points that are also 
regarded to of concern in this thesis are shown as following :  
“O soldiers of The Islamic State! Be ready for the final campaign of the crusaders. 
Yes, by Allah’s will, it will be the final one. Thereafter, we will raid them by Allah’s 
permission and they will not raid us. Be ready, for by Allah’s permission you are 
befitting for it. The crusaders have returned with a new campaign. They have come 
                                               
 
228  ISIS Audio Urges Muslims Everywhere to Kill  ‘Unbelievers’ “, (21 September 2014) 
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2014/09/21/isis-audio-threat-canada_n_5859062.html Huffington Post Retrieved 05-25-2015 
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so that the dust clears the fog disappears, and the masks fall, and thereby the hoax 
of falsehood is exposed and the truth becomes clearly visible”229 
“And so we promise you by Allah’s permission that this campaign will be your final 
campaign. It will be broken and defeated, just as all your previous campaigns were 
broken and defeated, except that this time we will raid you thereafter, and you will 
never raid us. We will conquer your Rome, break your crosses, and enslave your 
women, by the permission of Allah, the Exalted. This is His promise to us; He is 
glorified and He does fail in His promise. If we do not reach that time, then our 
children and grandchildren will reach it, and they will sell your sons as slaves at the 
slave market” 
“So mobilize your forces, O crusaders. Mobilize your forces, roar with thunder, 
threaten whom you want, plot, arm your troops, prepare yourselves, strike, kill, and 
destroy us. This will not avail you. You will be defeated.” 
“O Americans, and O Europeans, The Islamic State did not initiate a war against 
you, as your governments and media try to make you believe. It is you who started 
the transgression against us, and thus you deserve blame and you will pay a great 
price. You will pay the price when your economies collapse. You will pay the price 
when your son are sent to wage war against us and they return to you as disabled 
amputees, or inside coffins, or mentally ill.” 
                                               
 
229 ﺎﮭ ﻨ ﻋ ﷲ ﻲﺿر ﺔﺠ ﯾ ﺪﺧ ﺔ ﻨﺑ إ , Uploaded on (April 27 , 2015) ,” Indeed Your Lord is Ever Watchful "دﺎ ﺻﺮﻤ ﻟ ﺎ ﺒ ﻟ  ﻚﺑر نإ " 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H5Ym_Pohp3s  YouTube Retrieved 05-25-2015 
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“It was only then that the crusaders realized the extent of the threat. It was only then 
that their emotions and sentiments were stirred. It was only then that their hearts 
spoke and their tears flowed. It was only then that they suffered pain and anguish. It 
was only then that America and its allies rose in alarm and summoned one another, 
terrified. The jews The jews! Save the jews!“ 
“Indeed, the reality of their opposition and resistance has become very clear, and 
the nusayriyyah and rāfidah were not able to contain themselves. The nusayriyyah 
began openly calling for America’s help, and welcoming their strikes against The 
Islamic State, completely forgetting their alleged sovereignty, their imaginary 
strength and capabilities, and their enmity towards America, which in fact was just a 
lie.” 
“So rally around the mujahidin, O Sunnis of Shām, and stop your sons from joining 
the army and the sahwah councils, for what good is there in an army built by the 
crusaders which they then train on the laps of the tawāghīt230 
“Your state is facing a new campaign by the crusaders. So O muwahhid 231 , 
wherever you may be, what are you going to do to support your brothers? What do 
you wait for as the people have become two encampments and the heat of the war 
increases day by day muwahhid, we call you up to defend The Islamic State”  
“So O muwahhid, do not let this battle pass you by wherever you may be. You must 
strike the soldiers, patrons, and troops of the tawāghīt. Strike their police, security, 
and intelligence members, as well as their treacherous agents. Destroy their beds. 
                                               
 
230 Plural form of the word “ taghut” in terminology means any person, institution etc that changes the divine law in expanse of 
installing their own. 
231 In terminology, “muwahhid” is a person who testifies the oneness of Lord with their words and actions. 
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Embitter their lives for them and busy them with themselves. If you can kill a 
disbelieving American or European – especially the spiteful and filthy French – or 
an Australian, or a Canadian, any other disbeliever from the disbelievers waging 
war, including the citizens of the countries that entered into a coalition against The 
Islamic State, then rely upon Allah, an kill him in any manner or way however it 
may be. Do not ask for anyone’s advice and do not seek anyone’s verdict. Kill the 
disbeliever whether he is civilian or military, for they have the same ruling. Both of 
them are disbelievers. Both of them are considered to be waging war [the civilian by 
belonging to a state waging war against the Muslims]. Both of their blood and 
wealth is legal for you to destroy, for blood does not become illegal or legal to spill 
by the clothes being worn. The civilian outfit does not make blood illegal to spill, 
and the military uniform does not make blood legal to spill. The only things that 
make blood illegal and legal to spill are Islam and a covenant (peace treaty, 
dhimma, etc.). Blood becomes legal to spill through disbelief. So whoever is a 
Muslim, his blood and wealth sanctified and whoever is a disbeliever, his wealth is 
legal for a Muslim to take and his blood is legal to spill. His blood is like the blood 
of a dog; there is no sin for him in spilling it nor is there any blood money to be paid 
for doing such” 
“So O muwahhid! O you who believes in walā’ and barā’! will you leave the 
American the Frenchman, or any of their allies to walk safely upon the earth while 
the armies of the crusaders strike the lands of the Muslims not differentiating 
between a civilian and fight They have killed nine Muslim women three days ago by 
striking a bus transporting the from Shām to Iraq. Will you leave the disbeliever to 
sleep safely at home while the Muslim women and children shiver with fear of the 
roars of the crusader airplanes above their heads day and night? How can you 
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enjoy life and sleep while not aiding your brothers, casting fear into the hearts of the 
cross worshippers, and not responding to their strike with multitudes more?  
So O muwahhid! wherever you may be, hinder those who want to harm your 
brothers a state as much as you can. The best thing you can do is to strive to your 
best and kill a disbeliever, whether he be French, American, or from any of their 
allies. “ 
“If you are not able to find an IED or a bullet, then single out the disbelieving 
American, Frenchman, or any of their allies. Smash his head with a rock, or 
slaughter him with a knife, or run him over with your car, or throw him down from a 
high place, or choke him poison him. Do not lack. Do not be contemptible. Let your 
slogan be, “May I not be saved if the cross worshipper and taghūt (ruler ruling by 
manmade laws) patron survives. If you are unable to do so, then burn his home, car, 
or business. Or destroy his crops. If you are unable to do so, then spit in his face. If 
your self refuses to do so, while your brothers are being bombarded and killed, and 
while their blood and wealth everywhere deemed lawful by their enemies, then 
review your religion” 
As can be seen above, Adnani’s speech is profoundly stressing that ongoing war is 
between two camps; Muslims and Crusades and their allies which are Shi’a, 
Nusayriyya, Jews and apostate regimes. He justifies the cause and actions of the 
state, expects  participation of people to the ranks of The Islamic State , defines 
enemies and describes the way of acting against them . This is very vital especially 
when these words are uttered by second top rank person in the State.  
One another well-known speech of al-Adnani is named as “ Say : Die in Your 
Rage.” As It became a tradition for IS leaders to name their speech after a Qur’anic 
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verse, this speech also in such case. In Holy Qur’an, verse goes as the following 
“Here you are loving them but they are not loving you, while you believe in the 
Scripture - all of it. And when they meet you, they say, "We believe." But when they 
are alone, they bite their fingertips at you in rage. Say, "Die in your rage. Indeed, 
Allah is Knowing of that within the breasts."232 Release is uploaded online on 26th 
of January 2015233 in four languages by al-Furqan Media Outlet and is 9 minutes 
and 37 seconds long. 
00:54- 01:17 Gather ,O spiteful crusaders, and unify your allies amongst the 
apostates, the Rafidah and the atheists. Gather, from your alliance collectively and 
support one another. Gather every day and form your plots and schemes. Gather, 
conspire and mobilize. The muwahhids will fear you not!. The Mujahideen will not 
be frightened by you!234 
02:14- 02:53  O Jews, O Crusaders, O Rafidah, O murtaddin, O Sahwa, O 
criminals, O enemies of Allah altogether! Indeed we will remain upon our path, 
confident of our Lord’s support. So die in your rage! By Allah, you will not see from 
us- by the permission of Allah- except that which will grieve you. So praise be to 
                                               
 
232 Holy Qur’an , Chapter Ali Imran verse 119. 
233 Audio Statement by IS Spokesman Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani as-Shami –Say “ Die In your Rage” (26 January 2015), 
https://pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2015/01/26/audio-statement-by-is-spokesman-abu-muhammad-al-adnani-as-shami-
say-die-in-your-rage/ Pietervanostaeyen Retrieved 05-25-2015 
234 إﺔ ﻧ ﺑ  ﺔ ﺟﯾ د ﺧ ﻲﺿ ر  ﷲ  ﺎ ﮭ ﻧﻋ, (April 27, 2015) YouTube, “ﻢﻜﻈ ﯿ ﻐ ﺑ  ا ﻮ ﺗﻮﻣ ﻞ ﻗ " ﻲﻧ ﺎ ﻧ ﺪ ﻌﻟا  ﺦﯿ ﺸﻟ ا "، Say: "Die in Your Rage  
https://www.yotuube.com/watch?v=VI4IUuKn9A8  YouTube Retrieved 05-25-2015 
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Allah who has made The Islamic State a thorn in your eyes, a choking pain in your 
throats a spear in your chests and a rage burning in your hearts. Die in your Rage! 
04:14-04:53 Therefore, we call upon all the muwahhidin in Khurasan235to join the 
caravan of the Khilafah and abandon disunity and factionalism. So come to your 
state, o mujahidin.! Come to your Khilafah for your are the forerunners. You have 
fought the English, the Russians and the Americans and upon you today is a new 
fight; a fight to enforce tawhid and vanquish shirkq ( polytheism but here also 
includes Christianity and Judaism as well). So come forth! Humbling yourselves 
before Allah and Allah will honor you and raise you. Come forth, for this is an 
opportunity for the Muslims and it has not yet passed you by, so do not lose it. 
05-17-05:56 So unsheathe your swords and take out your spears! Be firm and do not 
weaken or soften. It will either be victory through which Allah will honor Islam and 
Muslims or martyrdom by which we will meet Allah having been excused and indeed 
we see victory only two bows’ length away or even closer. As for the near term, by 
Allah’s power and strength, this crusade will be broken and we will have thereafter-
by Allah’s permission- a meeting in al-Quds and an appointment in Rome, prior to 
which the crusade armies will be defeated in Dabiq236, indeed they see it as distant 
but we see it as near. 
07:33-07:59 Likewise, we renew our call to the muwahiddin in Europe and the 
disbelieving West and everywhere else, to target the crusaders in their own lands 
and wherever they are found. We will argue, before Allah, against any Muslim who 
                                               
 
235 Afghanistan, Pakistan and bordering part of Iran. 
236 Although Dabiq is a mere village in today’s Syria, in Islamic terminology it espouses a broader meaning which will be 
described in the following chapter. 
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has the ability to shed a single drop of crusader blood but does not do so, whether 
with an explosive device , a bullet, a knife, a car, a rock or even a boot or a fist.  
This speech requires a consideration bearing in mind Hebdo Attacks in France and 
parliament issues in Australia. So, clearly al-Adnani is asking Muslims all over the 
world to perform the same with what means they have or they can get and regardless 
of their whereabouts. Moreover, he lays emphasis on the enemies and clearly names 
them ( Shi’a, Coalition Force, Regimes in Middle East, Jews and Muslim forces who 
took their sides against The Islamic State) as al-Baghdadi does in his every other 
speech as well. This double-edged speech threatens the opponents of The Islamic 
State while trying to empower their own ranks. 
Al-Adnani made another speech of which name is “ So they Kill and Are Killed “ on 
12nd of March 2015 and released online by al-Furqan Media Outlet . Media is 27 
minutes and 52 seconds long.237 
05:47-06:53 “So come, O Muslims, to your State, for we call on you to mobilize for 
jihād and incite you and invite you to emigrate to your brothers in West 
Africa…“Here, there is open declaration of tawhīd. Here is the land of Islam. Here 
is the land of the Caliphate.”238 
After propagating The Islamic State  and calling Muslims to The Islamic State , al-
Adnani is specifying  
17:28-18:32 “ O Sunnis of Iraq, Sham, the Arabian Peninsula, and Yemen! We have 
warned you for a long time against the filthy Rafidah. What we warned you against 
                                               
 
237 The Islamic State Times,( no time specified) ,” http://istimes.tumblr.com/adnani” Retrieved 05-25-2015 
238  So They Kill and Are Killed , (March 2015) 
https://ia601504.us.archive.org/20/items/SoTheyKillAndAreKilled_201503/So%20They%20Kill%20and%20Are%20Killed.p
df” Archive.org  Retrieved 05-25-2015 
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has come to pass and we continue to warn you. If they lied to you  and showed you 
the soft skin of the snake before, then today they they have revealed their fangs and 
sprayed their venom. They have blatantly and brazenly announced their Safavid 
empire and its capitol, Baghdad. Today, they have unveiled their faces of rancor 
which you have seen in Baghdad, Damascus and Sanaa which you have seen in al-
Houla, Douma, and Baaniyas… The Safawid Rafidah today have entered a new 
stage in their war against the Sunnis. They have begun to believe that it is within 
their power to take areas of the Sunnis and control them completely. They no longer 
want a single Muslim from the Sunnis living in the empire they desire. ” 
20:02-21:15 O Sunnis in Iraq, Shām, the Arabian Peninsula, and Yemen, and we 
especially address those in Iraq! The filthy Safavid Rāfidah did not come from Iran, 
Basra, Najaf, Karbala, and other places, advancing towards their death, having 
their necks struck, their bodies dismembered, themselves slaughtered and killed like 
cattle… to defend you. The filthy Rāfidah’s claim of defending the Sunnis and 
securing their areas is only like the spiteful Crusaders’ claim of defending Islam, 
protecting it from corruption, and aiding the weak and oppressed. The Rāfidah 
came, O Sunnis, to take your homes, lands, and wealth. They came to kill your men 
and enslave your women. The Iranians came to take revenge on the Iraqis for the 
eighties. They came to take revenge on the Sunnis for al-Husayn (may Allah be 
pleased with him) whom they killed and over whom they have wept and beaten 
themselves for hundreds of years.” 
Spokesperson of The Islamic State has another speech uploaded online under 
the title “ What comes to you of good is from Allah” Uploaded on June 2014239 by 
                                               
 
239 The Islamic State Times, Ibid. 
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the al-Furqan Media Outlet. Duration of video is 16 minutes and 56 seconds and in 
Arabic language. 
09:59-10:33“Continue in your jihād. {And what is with Allah is better and more 
lasting.} 240 
The lions – lions of assassination – their ambitions 
 on battle day is to get the prey not his belongings.  
[poetry]  
March to meet your Lord. Don’t be distracted by victory. Don’t be gentle with your 
enemy, after Allah has granted you their shoulders. Continue your advance, for the 
furnace of war has not been fully heated, and it will not be so except in Baghdad and 
Karbala. So strap up and be ready, and be ready!.”241 
 
15:10-16:35 Roll up your sleeves to uncover arms of diligence. Do not compromise 
a single hand span of land you liberated. The Rawāfid must not step upon it once 
again except over your bodies and remains. Advance forward to Baghdad of 
[Hārūn] Ar-Rashīd, Baghdad of khilāfah, for we must settle some debts there. Be 
certain of Allah’s victory as long as you fear Him, for the Rawāfid are a forsaken 
nation. Allah is exalted above granting them victory over you, for they are 
mushrikīn, worshippers of men and stones. Finally, this is a message to the fool of 
the Rāfidah Nouri242. What have you done with your people, little fool? No one is 
more foolish than you except he who is pleased with you as a president and leader. 
You will always remain the seller of underclothing. You have nothing to do with 
                                               
 
240 Holy Qur’an, Al-Qasas : 60 
241 Abu Kerim, (December 3, 2014), “Whatever of Good Reaches You, Is from Allah” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-
SNW9qMA27A YouTube Retrieved 05-25-2015 
242 Nouri Al Maliki 
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politics and military leadership. You wasted a historical chance for your people to 
control Iraq. The Rāfidah will continue to curse you as long as some of them exist. 
Truly, between us is a settling of debts. You spoke the truth although you are a liar. 
There will be a heavy and long account. However, the settling of debts will not be in 
Samarra and Baghdad, rather in Karbala the defiled and Najad the most 
polytheistic. 
Other speech of al-Adnani is named as “ He will surely establish for them their 
religion which He has preferred for them” uploaded internet by Al-Furqan Media 
Outlet and translation of it is uploaded online by Fursal AlBalagh Media Translation 
Department of The Islamic State. Audio is 16’21” long and uploade on 3rd of April 
2014. Some important and related quotations from this speech is like following : 
02:28- 03:11 And whoever is thinking of entering into a war with us then he should 
consider this 1,000 times. O Ahlus-Sunnah (Sunni Muslims) in Mesopotamia (Iraq), 
verily the battle today has become evidently clear, it is a battle between Truth and 
falsehood, between disbelief and belief, between polytheism and monotheism, a 
battle between all of the Rawāfiḍ and all of Ahlus-Sunnah, and it will not end except 
with the supremacy of one of the two groups. So select which of the ranks you shall 
be among - and may Allah forbid - that the people of polytheism be victorious over 
the people of monotheism And so O Ahlus-Sunnah in Iraq, verily you should know 
the truth, and it is that there is no coexistence or peace with the Rawāfiḍ!.243 
04:05- 04:28 It is time that you O Sunnah of Iraq to know the way of honour and 
authority, the way of prosperity, security and happiness. It is time that you know 
                                               
 
243  Archive.org (No uploader name and information regarding the uploader.) 
https://ia700600.us.archive.org/13/items/al_adnani2/kalima.mp3 Retrieved 05-26-2015 
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there are no rights without Jihad, no justice without Jihad, no honour without Jihad, 
no security without Jihad, no hope without Jihad, no life without Jihad. 
06:58- 07:25 O groups of Sunnah in Iraq, it will not harm you to disbelieve in 
democracy and gather around the Mujāhidīn. It will not harm you to support and 
grant victory to the Religion of Allah. So form into a union this time headed by 
Sheikh Abū Bakr Al-Baghdādī, and by the Will of Allah you will never regret that, 
and if you are to gather around the Mujāhidīn, you will have control over the Arabs, 
and the Non-Arabs will be submissive to you, and you will rule the world. So gather 
around the Mujāhidīn! 
And Finally, there are total 21 speeches of al-Adnani 16 of which are released 
in the specified interval of this thesis duration which range between 60 minutes and 
9 minutes. 
 
 
